

102129

JPRS-UPS-85-018

4 March 1985

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

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4 March 1985

USSR REPORT

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, published in Moscow by the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title : PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA
No 5, 1984

Russian title : NARODY AZII I AFRIKI

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : A. A. Kutsenkov

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo Nauka

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : September-October 1984

Signed to press : 16 October 1984

Copies : 3,565

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Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy
literatury, 1984

ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 211-213

[Text] Oriental Urbanization: Urban Quasi-Traditional Sector

V. Ya. Byelokrenitsky

The article investigates into such specific features of the oriental urbanization, as the excess growth of modern cities, growth of tertiary sector, agrarian overpopulation pressure. The analysis is concentrated upon the last factor. The article demonstrates that for the most part the agrarian overpopulation accounts for the existence of the quasi-traditional sector of the urban economy. This sector is traditional technologically but in terms of the social mode of production it is modern. It should be distinguished from remnants of traditional urban structures, which still exist in certain countries.

The idea of the scope and proportion of the quasi-traditional sector is provided by the parallel to the informal sector, the concept of which was formulated in the early 1970's. These two sectors, however, do not fully overlap. The quasi-traditional sector exceeds the latter. The informal sector is usually demarcated through one criterion, that is the small number of persons employed. At the same time, tiny enterprises, included into the informal sector, have in their number some technologically modern ones, which fall out of the category of the quasi-traditional sector.

The article also offers a brief analysis of the social and class strata, which are related to the urban quasi-traditional sector. It pays attention to the non-factory (pre-industrial) working class, emphasizing, inter alia, its size, which is the result of the widely spread elements of the quasi-traditional sector in modern cities and a large gap in wages paid to the industrial and pre-industrial workers.

Emergence of Laotian Working Class

Yu. Ya. Mikheyev

The working class of Laos came into existence in the early 20th century. In the colonial period its evolution was connected with the French

entrepreneurship, the opening of the first tin mines, transport agencies, power stations, etc. Soon after its inception the working class joined the national liberation movement.

The article deals with the struggle of the Laotian people and the working class against the French colonialists and the American imperialists after the World War II. The industrial progress in the liberated zone fostered the growth of the working class. The leading role of the workers became especially manifest during the general uprising of 1975.

The establishment of a firm union of workers and peasants combined with the leading role of the working class was of paramount importance in the context of Laos. Establishing this union, the National Revolutionary Party of Laos maintained that the main thing was to keep a correct political line in order to mobilize and engage peasants in the revolutionary struggle.

The republic proclaimed, the working class has played a part of a vanguard in the protection of the motherland and implementation of socialist transformations. The article characterizes the respective decisions of the Second and Third Congresses of the Party. It is demonstrated that in the lapse of time after the Third Congress the working class and all the toilers of Laos have made a great progress in implementing its decisions.

The article sheds light upon the activity of the Front of National Construction of Laos and Laotian trade unions, both guided by the working class. The history of the Laotian working class testifies that although it had certain specific features, it is characterized by traits and natural patterns of development, which are typical of the countries advancing along the path of socialist construction. These are the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party, reliance upon the union with peasants, the leading role in implementing radical social and economic transformations, combination of patriotism and internationalism. These traits win the working class of Laos a great deal of respect both at home and in the international working class movement.

Sikh Nationalist Trends in Punjab

K. Z. Ashrafyan

The specific feature of the Sikh national movement is that it assumes appearance of a religious movement. The article defines it as a quasi-nationalism, for, as a matter of fact, the Sikhs do not constitute a separate nation. This movement came into existence in the context of a confessional disunity of the population of Punjab which had been preserved during the colonial rule. The Akali Dal Party, which heads the Sikh quasi-nationalism, is largely a rural party. The struggle for the "Punjabi suba" consolidated in its midst sections of petty and urban middle bourgeoisie.

The article focuses on the struggle for the translation into reality of the slogan of "autonomy," which was put forward at the Akali Dal Conference at Ananda-Sahib in 1973.

The demand for the autonomy has worsened the relations between the Akali Dal and the Indian National Congress. The article characterizes the ways and forms of the struggle waged by the Akali Dal activists, their political maneuvers and terrorist acts. It notes that the Sikh leaders take advantage of the existing economic problems, which are a by-product of the "green revolution" in Punjab, its economic underdevelopment and, as a result of this, of the atmosphere of extreme social tension in the state. The article pays attention to the stand taken by the Akali Dal in the elections campaigns at the local and all-Indian levels, the anti-government actions staged by the party. It describes the extremist trend in the Sikh quasi-nationalism, the separatist movement for the establishment of Khalistan." This trend is used by moderate regionalists as a lever to apply pressure upon the government. The article also highlights the government policy to this issue.

Drawing the conclusion, the article suggests that the changeability of national, religious, linguistic, economic and social problems is the ground upon which the Sikh quasi-nationalism breeds. The progressive forces of India have to do a great deal to overcome the communalist and separatist trends and to enhance the national unity and integrity.

"Moral Education" in Japanese Ideological Policy

V. T. Nanivskaya

The article deals with the system of "moral education," which is thoroughly elaborated and widely used in Japan to condition human beings. As the school syllabus puts it, its aim is to "bring up citizens of Japan."

This system came into existence in 1870-80's. From its very inception it promoted the class interests of the ruling circles and supported official ideology, which tried to instill the masses with the sentiments of "national exclusiveness." Analyzing the evolution of the system prior to 1945 and after the Second World War, the article notes that it was particularly resorted to in time of social changes, such as the Meiji Restoration and the democratic reforms after the Second World War. This system was called forth to perform important class functions, that is to stabilize the existing social and economic structure and to educate "faithful citizens."

The article interprets the Japanese understanding of the notions "morale" and "character." It reaches the conclusion that the system of "moral education" is an effective tool of psychological and social manipulation. Using it, the Japanese reaction tries to impose upon toilers views and ideology of the ruling circles by identifying their own interests with those of the former. However, despite this sophisticated ideological brain-washing, the class and political struggle is going on. It is headed by the Teachers Union and the progressive aims of this Union oppose the nationalist ideology.

Northern Caucasus in Russian-Iranian and Russian-Turkish Relations in Early Decades of 18th Century

N. A. Sotavov

The article investigates into the role played by the Northern Caucasus in the foreign policy of Russia, Iran and Turkey. As contribution to the analysis of

the North Caucasian peoples' relations with the adjacent countries, it is the first attempt to tackle these relations in the light of the resolvment of the North Caucasian problem during the discussed period.

The analysis is based upon numerous newly-found archive documents, original publications and copious literature in Persian, Turkish and European languages.

The article goes into the intricate world of the diplomatic and military rivalry over the Northern Caucasus and the vacillating political orientation of local rulers. It suggests that the early decades of the 18th century were a crucial period in the history of the Northern Caucasus. It was marked by the rapprochement between Iran and Russia and worsening of the Russian-Turkish relations over the solution to the North Caucasian problem.

The ever growing pro-Russian political orientation of the North Caucasian peoples became a pronounced trend of this period. It was this policy, as these peoples hoped, that would set them free from the Iranian oppression and protect from the never-ending Turko-Crimean aggression. The Russian military expedition to the Caspian Sea region was a major development in this rivalry and marked a new stage in the history of the Russian-Iranian and Russian-Turkish relations.

Individual in T'ang Legal Thinking

V. M. Rybakov

Using the T'ang code "T'ang-lu shu-yi" the article elucidates and examines the traditional Chinese values regarding the correlation of an individual's social functions, his social status and an individual, as such. Proceeding from the thesis that the hierarchy of punishment, as stipulated in the law, reflects to a certain degree the philosophical views of a given culture concerning society and the social position of an individual, the article summarizes a number of provisions of the Code, which interpret infringements upon an individual (murder, premeditation of murder, beatings, etc.). Variations in punishments in case of similar infringements committed under different circumstances (different functional and statutorial relations between the criminal and the victim) demonstrate that the idea of function dominated that of individual. Having shown the priority of function, understood as timely and in a proper way committed action, meaningful vis-a-vis surrounding members of the society, the article suggests that functions of this kind, which can be legally regulated in a clear-cut way, represent five basic manifestations of social situations: relationship, hierarchy, difference, confidence and moral obligation. This suggestion allows to intepret the term *se* in a new way as a method of social classification on the basis of a functional characteristic instead of a statutorial one, and reveal its philosophical content.

Archaic Consciousness: African Myths Dealing with Obtaining of Fire

V. B. Iordansky

Analysing various myths of Tropical Africa dealing with the dog which has stolen fire, the article demonstrates that the popular thought put the

obtaining of fire in the same brackets with such phenomena of the distant past, as the emergence of family as a compared to the initial promiscuity, the victory of men over women, the consolidation of power and doing away with anarchy within the society.

The article examines the interpretation of the fire in the African popular consciousness. At the same time, it attempts to answer why the dog has occupied such an important position in the African mythology. It is suggested that the series of myths dealing with the stealing of fire by the dog is a reflection of the process of a growing counterpoise of the world of culture to that of the natural barbarity. The comparison of the social order to the natural chaos takes in the archaic consciousness a form of rupture between man and demi-god.

Abu Hayyan Al-Tawhidi

Kitab Al-Imta' Wa'lmu'-Anasa. Sixth Chapter

Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi (died 1023) is one of the most interesting personalities of the Arab Khilafat of the 10th century. A philosopher and a writer, he was acclaimed as adib al-falasifa falasuf al-udaba and one of the three zindiqs of Islam (together with Ibn al-Rawandi and Abu'l-Aba al-Ma'arri). The oeuvres of Abu Hayyan are insufficiently studied and are untranslated into European languages.

The present excerpt is selected from one of the major works of Abu Hayyan. It belongs to what is known as the literature of adab and raises an all-important problem of the Moslem culture, namely that of the synthesis of the Arab cultural impulse with the heritage of ancient civilizations, which the Arabs encountered in the course of their conquests. As a matter of fact, the Arabs have assimilated the best of the cultural heritage of their predecessors. Far from diluting their national and religious identity, they have left an indelible imprint upon the peoples they had conquered and converted to Islam.

The Sixth chapter, or "night," discusses the drawbacks and virtues of various peoples, the Arabs and Persians in particular. It deals with the central theme of the book and demonstrates the way the Arabs regarded themselves as compared to other peoples and why they have succeeded in preserving their own identity.

The introduction offers a biography of Abu Hayyan and a brief analysis of the book. The translation is made from the only existing edition in three volumes, which was published in Cairo in 1939-1944.

Translation from the Arabic, Introduction, and Commentary by D. V. Frolov

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Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

CSO: 1812/85-E

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Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) p 210

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Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

8588

CSO: 1807/1307

URBANIZATION, QUASI-TRADITIONAL CITY LIFE IN EAST EXAMINED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 3-11

[Article by V. Ya. Belokrenitskiy: "Some Features of Urbanization in the East: The Urban Quasi-Traditional Sector"]

[Text] The socioeconomic evolution of Asian and African countries developing along capitalist lines is distinguished by a process of urbanization. The development of cities here is extremely quick¹ and contradictory. The cities are of exaggerated size and are devoid of many of the characteristic urban functions and features. As a rule, this is a result of the "population explosion" (strictly speaking, this is an "external" factor in relation to urbanization processes). The author of this article has attempted to analyze the "anomalies" of urbanization in the East, the general process of which has been quite thoroughly elucidated in literature, from the standpoint of "internal," related socioeconomic developments. Of course, the author does not deny the significance of demographic factors, on which many of the parameters of the urbanization process depend.

Our analysis of the socioeconomic structure of modern capitalist cities in Asia and Africa indicates the presence of several sectors; the most specific of these, and therefore the one warranting special attention, is the quasi-traditional sector.

In works on urbanization, this process is regarded as a process of the augmentation of the social role of cities, especially modern large centers, and the related urban way of life. In these studies, urbanization is not confined to the growth of cities (big cities) and of the urban population, but also includes the spread of urban relations and the urban lifestyle to rural areas.²

This approach leads either directly or indirectly to the interpretation of the "urban" (from the formal, legal-administrative standpoint) zone as a heterogeneous one, including urban and "partially" urban elements, now taking the form (primarily in developing countries) of a network of small cities of the traditional type and extremely small semiurban and semirural settlements. There are also "non-urbanized" zones within big cities (populated by rural migrants with a rural way of life). The existence of these zones and of small cities is viewed as evidence of false, imaginary, pseudo- or quasi-urbanization.

The emphasis which is sometimes placed on the specific ("urban" or "modern") way of life underscores what might be called the civilized aspect of urbanization. It is associated with external features: certain types of buildings, public conveniences, etc. Formative characteristics, however, are of primary significance in determining the essence of urbanization. The city which makes its appearance during a certain stage in the development of productive forces and production relations and which thereby becomes one of the signs of progressive social evolution has certain structural features corresponding to the given era (with a view to the prevailing forms of property ownership in the society).³

In connection with this, we should consider one of the views expressed in our literature, in accordance with which the theoretical interpretation of the process by which cities are formed and developed points up a social aspect, reflecting the specific features of cities, and an ecological aspect, reflecting their common features. According to the general definition, the city is a specific human living environment. It comes into existence and exists as a result of the development of production, "in which there is no direct connection or direct technological link with the land."⁴ This approach to the city allows the analyst to compare common and specific features in its past and present. In the case of today's Eastern cities, this means that two factors have to be taken into account--their socioeconomic nature (structural characteristics) and their "ecological" differences from rural areas. It seems that the urban areas in the majority of Eastern countries developing along capitalist lines already have firmly established structural features. This does not preclude the continuation of a transition process in some areas, the disappearance of the old foundations of urban life and the birth of new ones, and it does not exclude the possibility that this process will be extremely slow in some areas. As for the second of these factors, it is obvious that even the traditional city (one which has not completed the structural transition) is part of the urban zone because it is directly, technologically "isolated from the land."⁵ Its growth (now primarily due to demographic factors) is not part of the urbanization process, however, because urbanization has historically and logically begun only at the start of the capitalist era, at the time of the development of big industry and industrial productive forces, when the city acquires its "own foundation for development."⁶

In line with this approach to urbanization, there are three factors with a direct impact on this process in the East--industrialization, the development of the tertiary sector and agrarian overpopulation. The first two are not confined to the developing countries. Both industrialization, signifying the development of modern industrial sectors, and the expansion of the tertiary sector, the sphere of distribution and services, reflect a worldwide tendency toward the heightened productivity of labor, particularly the productivity of agriculture, which allows increasing numbers of people to leave the agricultural sphere and move into "urban" branches of the economy.

In world literature there is the popular view that the processes of urbanization and industrialization do not coincide in many respects in the developing countries. This thesis is generally proved by comparing two indicators: the percentage of the economically active population employed in industrial sectors

and the percentage of the population living in cities. In Western Europe the ratio of the two indicators was approximately 2:1 in the second half of the last century. In today's developing countries the ratio is the opposite--1:2, and they are therefore described as super-urbanized states.⁷ The same ratio, however, is typical of developed capitalist states at the present time.⁸ We can only wonder why a ratio taken from another period of history and from another stage in the development of the industrial (or, in the broader sense, technological) revolution should be considered "normal" for the developing countries. Can the fact that the relative number of urbanites in the developing countries today is close to the relative number in 19th century Europe serve as grounds for this? It appears that the process of industrialization in today's Asian, African and Latin American countries is closer, in terms of its characteristics and consequences, to present processes in developed capitalist states than to a bygone stage in the evolution of the latter and in the development of world productive forces. The determining factors here include the immeasurable increase in the capital input and effectiveness of modern production. The first of these means that capital "supplants" fewer workers, and the second means that the rapid increase in social wealth is accompanied by increased employment in the tertiary sector.

Far from all of the population registered as "industrial" in the developing countries participates in the process of industrialization. In several Eastern countries much of this population consists of rural inhabitants, and even some urbanites, engaged in traditional or semitrade crafts. For this reason, the ratio of industrial to urban populations will be much lower than in the developed countries (1:3 or 1:4), but this is not the opposite ratio resulting from the comparison of data on Eastern and Western countries separated by a century.

If we consider that the impact of industrialization consists in the inclusion of the urban population in industrial activity and in the modification of the functions of cities, especially big ones, to augment their role in economic affairs and, indirectly, in societal affairs in general, this impact turns out to be much more substantial than it might appear at first.⁹ As the productivity of social labor is augmented, the sphere of distribution and services plays a more important role in the urbanization process, and this is accompanied by a relative decrease in industrialization's direct effects on urbanization. Furthermore, the sphere of distribution and services is generally even larger than the sphere of industrial production and is localized in cities as centers of business and political activity.¹⁰

The growth of the tertiary sector of cities in Eastern developing capitalist countries is influenced by the rising productivity of social production in their economies and in the centers of the world capitalist economy. In the past decade this factor began to play a special role in connection with changes in the distribution of goods on the global scale, namely the redistribution of part of the GDP of industrially developed capitalist countries to the benefit of oil-exporting countries, primarily several Near and Middle Eastern states.¹¹

The third factor of urbanization in the Eastern countries, agrarian overpopulation, is of a different nature. Whereas the first two factors discussed

above are the result of the development of productive forces, the third is the result of their inadequate development, the immaturity of social relations and the defective nature of economic structures. Agrarian overpopulation, or, in other words, the pauperism of the rural masses, is engendered and exists on several levels. The deepest level is destitution, and the machinery for its reproduction came into being in the depths of the traditional society of the pre-colonial era. A less "ancient" but more pervasive form is agrarian overpopulation as a result of the rural conditions of life in colonial countries and, to a lesser degree, in dependent countries in modern and contemporary history. Both of these types of agrarian overpopulation are pre-capitalist. Post-colonial development gave birth to another type of overpopulation--the traditional type engendered by the stagnation and degradation of production.¹² Finally, the development of capitalism in rural areas gave birth to agrarian overpopulation of the capitalist type, connected with property status distinctions and with the ruin of the peasantry.

If cities do not have enough demand for labor, rural areas can provide the rural population with employment and keep it from moving to the cities only up to a certain point. After certain overpopulation limits have been exceeded, the "surplus" rural population will move to the cities and will increase urban overpopulation. Furthermore, different "strata" of rural pauperism "supply" the cities with different "human material." Several generations of poverty and destitution inhibit the development of a number of important human qualities; manpower is reproduced in "decayed form." The ruin of peasant communities which have owned property and have never been inferior is a different matter. In this case, the members suffer emotionally but do not display physical "deterioration." They can find a livelihood in the modern capitalist sector of the urban economy. For this reason, we can assume that rural pauperism of recent origin, particularly the capitalist type, is more likely to nurture capitalist urbanization, whereas the traditional, "age-old" poverty can "regenerate" traditional urbanization.¹³ This is far from a constant pattern in the East, but it is quite perceptible in several countries, including those with the largest populations--India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia. The reproduction of traditional urban structures (just as in the case of modern ones) is accompanied by accelerated population growth.

Three socioeconomic sectors can be discerned in the economy of the modern Eastern city in accordance with urbanization factors. The first of these, the industrial sector, is the result of the development of the industrial form of capitalist productive forces and concentrates industrial labor within its framework.¹⁴ Labor is exploited by capital in this sector. This is the basic sector of the urban economy in the technical and economic sense. In addition to industrial production, the industrial sector includes construction, the infrastructure and the portion of trade representing an "extension" of production.¹⁵

The second sector of the urban economy and all urban life, the sphere of distribution and services, is closely related to the first; it is the site of intermediate phases of the industrial reproductive process--distribution and exchange, as well as processes of redistribution. The sector includes the circulation of capital, state and public services, and the performance of personal services, representing the exchange of labor (primarily "in the form

of movement rather than in the form of objects")¹⁶ for income from capital appropriated directly or through redistribution.

In contrast to the first two sectors, the third sector, formed as a result of urban overpopulation or, more precisely, its stagnant elements, does not include an active labor force. Since this sector exists within the modern capitalist city, it can be regarded as one of its products, but it is also a sphere dominated by traditional (pre-industrial) productive forces and methods of labor organization (cooperation); it is precisely for this reason that we feel it would be more accurate to describe it as a quasi- or pseudo-traditional sector,¹⁷ particularly in view of the fact that some of the features of its "base" and its "superstructure" are traditional; this is connected with the tenacity of the latter. On the socioeconomic level, the quasi-traditional sector is heterogeneous--it contains elements of small-scale commercial production and of semicapitalist and capitalist relations. These elements do not exist in isolation; they are closely interwoven and are influenced by the dominant capitalist structure, representing its periphery.

This sector consists of two parts: physical production, and distribution and services. In the first subsector the main organizational forms are varieties of fragmented and centralized manufacture (sometimes including the limited use of machine power) and simple cooperative labor (in construction, for example). The association and brigade types of cooperative labor are the most prevalent here; there are also the relations of non-capitalist and semi-capitalist hiring and the exploitation of the labor of family members.

Activity in the other subsector is based on the same principles, but its very nature essentially precludes centralization, presupposing a network of separate "nuclei," widespread intermediate relations, personal dependence and imaginary independence. The main forms of activity are the exchange of goods produced outside the industrial sector, petty trade (often adding nothing to the consumer value of the product and representing a form of consumer service), money-lending, the purchase and resale of used clothing, rags and other second-hand goods and the performance of imaginary (negligible or imposed) services.

The relationship between the two subsectors has changed in recent decades, and obviously in favor of the latter. This is due to the lower cost of goods produced in the industrial sector and the consequent reduction of the importance of cottage industry and handicrafts. The infiltration of the urban markets of "poor" Asian and African countries by cheap unsaleable goods from the imperialist states (within the framework of programs of "aid" and "charity") is having the same effect. The trade in these goods, which are crowding locally manufactured items out of the market, has turned into a rapidly growing business there and includes some operations of a productive nature (repairs, alterations, etc.).¹⁸

The importance of what is sometimes called the parallel economy in modern Eastern cities cannot be ignored. This term is generally used to define the portion of private capitalist economic activity which is not controlled or regulated by the state. This is the sphere of blackmarket transactions (which are not officially recorded and are not subject to taxation) and of

underground or illegal business. This sector plays a particularly important role in construction, transportation and trade (including smuggling and the drug trade). Prostitution, begging and gambling are still prevalent in this sphere. The "parallel economy" generally has a traditional appearance (with uniquely national features), but its pseudo-traditional nature is self-evident.

We will attempt to determine the size of the quasi-traditional sector and its relative importance in the modern Eastern city. This can be judged to some degree from data on what is known as informal employment. This term has been widely used in foreign literature since the beginning of the 1970's.¹⁹ Studies conducted by the International Labor Organization (ILO) as part of the "world employment program" included enterprises and establishments with few employees (less than 10 or, more rarely, less than 5) in the informal sector. To the degree that this sphere of employment coincides with the sphere of pre-industrial productive forces and forms of labor cooperation, it is part of the quasi-traditional sector, which takes in most of the enterprises on the lowest level. The quasi-traditional elements not fitting into the informal sector are larger production units and other economic units with a pre-industrial technical and organizational base.

According to data for the 1970's, the informal sector in large Indian cities, Calcutta and Ahmadabad, included around half (40-50 percent) of the entire employed population. The situation was similar (45 percent) in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. Employment in the informal sector in Colombo (Sri Lanka) and Singapore was much lower (19 percent and 23 percent).²⁰ This difference is not a coincidence. It is due largely to the differing degrees of overpopulation in these cities and is indirectly affected by the severity of the problem of agrarian overpopulation and the entire demographic situation in a country.

Unfortunately, there is little information about the proportion accounted for by the informally employed population in the total income of urban inhabitants. It is known, for example, that the figure is 30 percent in Jakarta and 28 percent in Ahmadabad. The few available data indicate that the informal sector's share of income is approximately half as great as its share of employment.

Of course, the socioeconomic role of a sector or branch cannot be confined only to the income received by the people employed in it. Besides this, the Asian cities studied by ILO missions are not, in our opinion, fully representative of the total group of large modern Asian cities. Studies of some cities in Tropical Africa and Latin America, also conducted as part of the same "world employment program," proved that the sphere of informal employment could include up to 70 percent of the entire working population.²¹

The third sector of the modern city corresponds in many respects (the prevalence of manual labor, small-scale trade, etc.) to the economy of the traditional city. But they differ in the main respect, because the traditional economy (wherever it still exists) represents the world of pre-capitalist socioeconomic relations. The most prominent activities in this economy are crafts (work performed on orders or simple commodity production), the exchange of products (as an extension of this production) and the traditional exchange of services.

Various forms marking the transition from the traditional city to the modern one are now more prevalent in the East. The small-scale commercial structure is the main one in this intermediate zone.

Therefore, if we consider the entire urban zone, the small units for the production and exchange of products, goods and services in this zone will fall into three categories: traditional, semitraditional and quasi-traditional.

What is the status and what are the distinctive features of the main social-class strata connected with the quasi-traditional sector of the modern city--the petty bourgeoisie, non-factory (pre-industrial) workers and the semi- and lumpenproletariat?

The petty urban bourgeoisie in the majority of Eastern countries evolved from a "medieval" stratum to a modern one as the Afro-Asian cities acquired a new feature. Urban overpopulation increased its size and reduced its social potential (the prospect of evolving into a bourgeoisie). This occurred when most of its members had to serve the needs of the poor population and their income dropped to the wage level of factory and plant workers.²²

The most common "profession" for the petty bourgeoisie is trade. The independent merchant, however, has to work with an eye to the needs of the "poor urban majority." When his customers become members of more wealthy strata, this is generally the result of his inclusion in the large trade network and his complete or partial transformation into a hired trade worker.

The influence of small-scale producers--artisans and craftsmen--in the petty bourgeoisie is declining. Their status is adversely affected by the above-mentioned competition from goods which were produced at larger enterprises, most of which are not new or did not appeal to the customers for whom they were originally intended. The same tendencies explain the relative increase in the number of intermediate occupations in the petty bourgeois stratum--various types of repairs, installation operations, etc.

Urban overpopulation and the accumulation of unutilized labor resources in the cities keep the price of unskilled labor low. This provides extensive opportunities for its exploitation by capital, and generally in forms unregulated by society or the state. The non-industrial proletariat falls into two categories. One consists of the workers of "factory manufacture," including both small and fairly large enterprises.²³ The second category consists of non-industrial workers employed in cottage industry. Hired employees work here along with the owner or members of his family. This is the cottage industry proletariat, and part of it, strictly speaking (with a view not only to the sale of labor but also to the "social quality" of the employer), consists of hired workers of the pre-capitalist type. It is significant, however, that seemingly independent establishments (for example, shops with a few manual or automatic looms) are often mere links in the system of the capitalist exploitation of labor by commercial or commercial-industrial capital or by state capital functioning in small-scale industry. In this case, what seems to be a pre-capitalist form of hiring is actually a form of capitalist exploitation.

Many pre-industrial workers are concentrated in medium-sized and small modern cities and in the rural outskirts of large urban centers. The semiurban-semirural nature of this segment of the working class creates additional opportunities for its exploitation because it allows employers to avoid interference by public opinion in the working and living conditions of the workers and to reduce their overhead costs by using the cheaper manpower outside the modern urban labor market.

The pre-industrial proletariat represents the most exploited and backward segment of the working class. In fact, this is how this stratum of workers could once have been described in all of the capitalist countries. This was pointed out repeatedly by K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin.²⁴ The only difference in the modern Eastern city, especially in countries with the largest populations, is probably the larger size of the non-factory proletariat and the higher relative number of skilled workers in the factory proletariat. This is part of the reason for the considerable difference in the wage levels of the average worker in industrial and pre-industrial production units.

Members of the semiproletarian strata occupy a position midway between the proletariat and the small owner. The semiproletariat in modern Eastern cities includes a large stratum of allegedly (completely or partially) independent owners. It also includes the hired workers who have not severed their ties with rural areas, own land there and earn an income from it--that is, people who make only part of their living by selling their labor.

The lumpenproletariat, represented by two groups--semideclassed paupers and the completely declassed lumpen population--is also a sizeable and constantly growing substratum in modern cities in the majority of Eastern countries and is generally connected to some degree with the functioning of the sphere of illegal or semilegal business.

The social structure resulting from overpopulation also includes other basic elements. Most of them have common sources of replenishment. Rural migrants represent the most important source. It is true that the petty bourgeoisie is augmented to a lesser degree by recent migrants from rural areas, but it is more likely to be joined by former rural inhabitants after they have been in the city for some time. The lumpenproletariat is also a stable element of the urban population: It takes a long time to become "ingrained" in the pores of a big city.

The living conditions of the population "personifying" the quasi-traditional sector of the modern Eastern city are similar in general. Its financial status ranges from low to extremely low, and housing is crowded, unprotected from heat and cold and lacking the elementary conveniences of drinking water, plumbing and electricity. The lower strata of modern cities huddle together in old and run-down neighborhoods, but they are even more likely to live on the outskirts of cities, in settlements consisting of mud huts and shacks. The life of the social strata connected with the quasi-traditional sector has external similarities to the way of life of the lower strata in the traditional and semitrade cities. For this reason, zones of poverty and indigence in all cities are viewed from the same standpoint. This is inaccurate because

the social makeup of the lowest levels of traditional and quasi-traditional strata differs. This means that we are dealing, therefore, with "slums" of different types.

The lower strata of the modern city are contiguous at all points to the industrial proletariat, particularly the lowest, unskilled stratum of factory workers and auxiliary personnel. It could be said, in fact, that the entire unskilled labor force represents a single social group in the modern city. Individual changes of status can take place within this group. The families of workers in the quasi-traditional sector "supply personnel" for modern sectors and serve as a refuge for people driven out of these sectors.

The situation of traditional and semitraditional urban lower strata is different. Their social ties are still reproduced on their earlier foundation. Remaining within the framework of the "old world," they are objectively deprived of contacts with the modern working class, both its factory and non-factory segments.

In conclusion, we should stress that significant changes have taken place in the Eastern urban society since the time when the Eastern countries freed themselves of political dependence and colonialism. Under the conditions of capitalist development, the cities have essentially acquired a socioeconomic structure corresponding to this development pattern. The saturation of rural areas with "surplus" population and the development of the industrial-urbanized complex are intensifying rural-urban migration and increasing the "flow" of part of the agrarian population (rural paupers) into the cities. The colossal scales of urban overpopulation are certainly the main distinctive feature of the capitalist city in the East. The existence of tenacious forms of urban unemployment in these cities has been accompanied by the development of a large sector of the urban economy which can be categorized as traditional in the technological and organizational respects but is completely modern from the standpoint of the social method of production. This quasi-traditional sector must be distinguished from surviving remnants of the traditional and semitraditional urban structures.

FOOTNOTES

1. In 1950 there were around 150 million urbanites in Asia and Africa (excluding the PRC and Japan). According to estimates, the figure rose to approximately 430 million by 1980, 30 years later. By the end of this century, according to UN forecasts, the number of urbanites will exceed a billion ("UN. Estimates and Projections of Rural, Urban and City Population 1950-2025. The 1980 Assessment," N.Y., 1982, p 8).
2. See, for example: V. V. Pokshishevskiy, "Geografiya naseleniya zarubezhnykh stran" [Geographic Population Patterns in Foreign Countries], Moscow, 1971, p 124; Yu. L. Pivovarov, "Sovremennaya urbanizatsiya. Osnovnyye tendentsii rasseleniya" [Modern Urbanization. Basic Trends in Population Settlement Patterns], Moscow, 1976, p 16.

3. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 46, pt I, pp 462-472.
4. M. N. Mezhevich, "Sotsial'noye razvitiye i gorod" [Social Development and the City], Leningrad, 1979, pp 77-78.
5. It must be borne in mind, however, that some traditional settlements (primarily in Tropical Africa) which are of urban size cannot be regarded as cities because the settlements do not differ in any way from rural communities in terms of their functions and the occupations of their inhabitants (see L. F. Blokhin, "The Search for a Dynamic Balance Between the Rural Community and the Humid Tropical Environment," in "Razvivayushchiesya strany: demograficheskaya situatsiya i ekonomicheskiy rost" [The Developing Countries: The Demographic Situation and Economic Growth], Moscow, 1981, pp 253-254).
6. Ibid.; also see O. N. Yanitskiy, "Urbanizatsiya i sotsial'nyye protivorechiya kapitalizma" [Urbanization and the Social Contradictions of Capitalism], Moscow, 1975, pp 96-97.
7. This point of view was first developed in the works of American authors K. Davis, H. Golden, B. Hozelitz and P. Hauser (see K. Davis and H. H. Golden, "Urbanization and the Development of Pre-Industrial Areas," ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, Chicago, 1954, No 3; B. Hozelitz, "Urbanization and Economic Growth in Asia," ibid., 1957, No 1; P. Hauser, "Urbanization in Asia and the Far East," Calcutta, 1957).
8. "UN. Patterns of Urban and Rural Population Growth," N.Y., 1980, pp 18-19.
9. T. S. Pokatayeva, "Razvivayushchiesya strany: problemy urbanizatsii" [The Developing Countries: Problems of Urbanization], Moscow, 1977, pp 230-235.
10. This served as, in addition to other things, grounds for some authors to assign the development of tertiary sectors the deciding role in the urbanization process (see, for example, G. Besh, "Geografiya mirovogo khozyaystva" [The Geography of the World Economy], Moscow, 1966, p 247).
11. "Vostok: rubezh 80-kh godov" [The East at the Beginning of the 1980's], Moscow, 1983, pp 26-27.
12. For the specific ways in which foreign capitalist surroundings affect the African rural community, giving rise to this level of overpopulation, see L. F. Blokhin, Op. cit., pp 241-244.
13. Without going into a detailed discussion of the different interpretations of the term "urbanization," we will note only that Soviet authors use the term in the narrow sense in which it is used in our article and in the broader sense of a process of urban development during any historical era (see, for example: V. I. Gulyayev, "Goroda-gosudarstva mayya" [The Mayan City-States], Moscow, 1979; E. P. Smuzhina, "Kitayskiy gorod

XI-XIII vv.: ekonomicheskaya i sotsial'naya zhizn'" [The Chinese City of the 11th-13th Centuries: Economic and Social Life], Moscow, 1979; and others). It seems to us that the term urbanization can only be used in the hypothetical sense in discussions of the pre-capitalist, pre-industrial era and that its traditional nature must always be underscored in these cases.

14. For a discussion of the varieties of labor in the developing countries and its division into industrial and non-industrial, see Ye. A. Bragina, "Unemployment, Employment and the Motivation for Labor in the Developing Countries," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, Moscow, 1981, No 4, pp 19-20.
15. "Trade adds new consumer value to the product (and this is the rule [for trade in general] from top to bottom, extending to retail trade, which weighs, measures and packages the product and thereby puts the product in form suitable for consumption)" (K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 46, pt II, p 137).
16. Ibid., vol 46, pt I, p 455.
17. For the use of the latter term in a similar context, see V. V. Krylov, "The Capitalist-Oriented Form of Development in Newly Liberated Countries (An Inquiry into the Methodology of Marxist Research)," RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR, 1983, No 2, pp 20-37.
18. In Pakistan, for example, some estimates put the number of people engaged in these operations at over 2 million (VIEWPOINT, Lahore, 1982, vol VII, p 24).
19. It was first used in 1971 by English researcher K. Hart in an analysis of unemployment in Ghana. The term "informal sector" was then employed by many specialists in the West and in the developing countries. Nevertheless, the term itself and the related approach to the problems of urban unemployment and poverty, in accordance with which it is assigned decisive significance as an analytical instrument, were criticized by Western scholars. See, for example, "The Urban Informal Sector. Critical Perspectives on Employment and Housing Policies," Oxford, 1979.
20. "The Urban Informal Sector in Developing Countries," Geneva, 1981, p 214.
21. Ibid.
22. For example, according to the findings of a study of small establishments in Manila, the income of most of their owners was equivalent to the wages of semiskilled factory and plant workers. In general, the "independent owner-workers" in Colombo and Jakarta have an even smaller income; in Jakarta only 10 percent of the "independent" owners had one to three hired employees, and only 2.5 percent had more (ibid., pp 112, 141).
23. A characteristic example of the latter is the brick plant with hundreds or even thousands of employees.

24. Sufficient evidence of this can be found on the well-known pages of such works as K. Marx' "Capital," F. Engels' "The Status of the Working Class in England," other works by Marx and Engels and works by V. I. Lenin in which he discusses the destitution and excessive workload of "craftsmen," artisans and members of other working class strata occupying a place in capitalism's "border" zones (see V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 2, p 350 et passim; vol 4, p 290; and so forth).

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Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

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CSO: 1807/137

CURRENT STATUS OF LAOS WORKING CLASS DISCUSSED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 12-19

[Article by Yu. Ya. Mikheyev: "The Establishment of the Working Class in Laos"]

[Excerpts] The working class in Laos made an important contribution to the revolutionary struggle of the people of its country.

Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) Kaysone Phomvihane had this to say about the main features of the Lao proletariat: "Despite its relative youth, the Laos working class, whose birth and maturation coincided with the period of the Lao people's long and hard struggle for total liberation, has the characteristic features of the international working class: a vanguard role in the revolutionary struggle, loyalty to revolutionary ideals, consistency in struggle, a sense of camaraderie and genuine patriotism combined with a pure sense of internationalism. The Lao working class acquired its best features as a result of its skillful continuation and multiplication of the patriotic traditions of the people's struggle against foreign invaders; as a result of its progression along a road illuminated by the light of Marxist-Leninism under the leadership of its vanguard, a genuine Marxist-Leninist party--the LPRP; as a result of its united action with the working class and people of fraternal Vietnam and Kampuchea in the struggle against a common enemy; as a result of the invariable support and assistance it received from the people of the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries and from the world workers movement."¹

The Great October Socialist Revolution had a tremendous rousing effect on the working class and all laborers in Laos and the other countries of Indochina. "At a time when Laos seemed to be submerged in utter darkness, the October Revolution with its brilliant light illuminated the road to freedom for the people of Indochina," K. Phomvihane said.²

The working class of Laos was born at the dawning of the 20th century, when this country and other parts of Indochina were under colonial rule. The French had to promote some industrial development in the country in order to use Lao natural resources and to satisfy the needs of the colonial

administration and the feudal lords cooperating with it. At that time the growth of the Lao working class was connected with the commercial activity of French colonizers.

Later the main means of production in industry in the liberated zone were made public property. Enterprises were built for the manufacture of consumer goods, metal-working and textile plants were erected, and traditional crafts were developed. The working class grew quickly. National personnel were trained on a broad scale for various sectors of the economy.⁹

As a result, the working class of Laos, which numbered only a few thousand under French rule, already had tens of thousands of members at the time of the struggle against the American aggressors and their local puppets.¹⁰ Workers were active fighters during the war; they fought on the enemy's home front against the authoritarian behavior of local reactionaries and their American patrons, tried to improve working conditions and supported revolutionaries. The successes of patriotic forces made it possible for the LPRP to set the following objective at its second congress: "To complete the people's national-democratic revolution throughout the country and then move on to the phase of socialist revolution--the construction of socialism and communism in Laos."¹¹

The workers' leading role in the revolutionary movement was most apparent at the time of the general uprising in 1975. The workers were in the front lines of those who defended plants, factories and the water and power network against diversionary acts by reactionaries and their hirelings, created administrative bodies to manage enterprises, secured their uninterrupted operation, resolutely opposed the attempts of employers to bribe unstable elements and encourage them to emigrate, etc. The activity of the working class aided considerably in the completion of the national-democratic revolution and the transition to socialist revolution.

On 2 December 1975 the National Congress of People's Representatives dissolved the monarchic order and proclaimed the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The LPRP became the ruling party. Under its guidance the country began to build a socialist society.¹² "These events," Kaysone Phomvihane wrote, "were the crowning touch in the Lao people's magnificent victory. They marked the beginning of a new and brilliant page in the history of our country and paved its way to peace, independence, unity and a direct transition to socialism, bypassing capitalism."¹³

The problems the popular government of the LPDR encountered were exceptionally difficult. A progressive political order had been established in the country, but its economic base was extremely underdeveloped. Around 85 percent of the population worked in agriculture, the basis of the national economy, and feudal and even pre-feudal forms of land use still survived in several regions. Rural reconstruction was impeded by the low marketability level of agriculture, the absence of the necessary financial resources, the inadequate supply of technical equipment and the shortage of skilled specialists. Colossal damages were caused by the war, which lasted almost 30 years. American planes dropped more than 3 million bombs and large quantities of toxic chemicals on the

territory of Laos. As a result of military operations, almost 40 percent of the arable land ceased to be used for farming and 25 percent of the population was displaced. After the republic was established, the governments of the United States and some of its allies immediately cut off aid to Laos and actually organized an economic blockade of the country, which injured it greatly.

The primary objectives of the LPRP and LPDR Government were the restoration of the economy and the institution of profound socioeconomic reforms. The needs of agriculture and forestry demanded accelerated industrial development. Several industrial enterprises had to be built, such as repair shops for transport vehicles, tractors and machines, enterprises for the manufacture of components and spare parts for them, enterprises for the production of simple and better tools of labor, threshers, winnowers, rice mills, various types of construction equipment and irrigation devices, and enterprises for the processing of agricultural products and the production of vital necessities. In addition, surveying, planning and design operations had to be conducted in preparation for the construction of state enterprises in mining, the chemical industry, metallurgy and hydraulic power engineering, and strategic roads had to be built.¹⁴

After the declaration of the republic, the working class played a vanguard role in the protection of the motherland and the institution of socialist reforms and became the leading force in the construction of a material and technical base for socialism.

The Third LPRP Congress on 27-30 April 1982 was an important stage in the development of the working class. It summed up the results of past years and officially announced the plan to build a socialist society in the country.

By that time the republic had attained perceptible results in all spheres of life. During the years of the popular regime, the gross social product increased by 43 percent, per capita national income rose 40 percent and the gross product of agriculture and forestry increased 1.5-fold. The gross rice yield reached 1.154 million tons in 1981, as compared to 700,000 tons in 1976, and the number of cattle rose from 900,000 to 1.3 million. The quantity of agricultural machines quintupled. In 1980 the country became self-sufficient in terms of food. Capacities were restored and augmented in such branches as electrical power engineering, machine repair, the coal industry, salt-making, the production of kaolin and construction materials, the food industry and others. Output figures for 1981 in comparison to 1976 were 3.57 times as high for electricity, 15 times as high for brick and 1.5 times as high for agricultural implements and food industry products. Around 600 kilometers of roads were laid, many warehouses were built and dozens of cities and villages which had been destroyed in the war were restored.

State and state-private sectors were established in industry, agriculture, trade and transportation, and the private sector was put under the control of the state. At the beginning of 1982 the state controlled 188 industrial enterprises with 15,000 workers, all air transport and 60 percent of all motor transport; 31 state farms (rural and forest) were founded. There were 180 state trade enterprises, 356 consumer cooperative stores and 150 consumer service centers in the country. A national bank was founded.¹⁵

The congress outlined the party's general line for the period of transition to socialism and set specific objectives for the coming 5 years (1981-1985). The political report of the LPRP Central Committee, approved at the congress, said that the construction of socialism in a country with a prevalence of small-scale production units and an autarchic natural economy would include many transition stages, and that the road to socialism would be long and exceptionally arduous under these conditions. The report also said that industrialization would be the core of the transition period and the foundation for the development of productive forces in the country.¹⁶ Plans were finalized at the congress for the development of cottage industry, light industry, power engineering, the construction materials industry, machine repair facilities for agriculture and forestry, transportation and communications and the reinforcement, enlargement and construction of several industrial enterprises for mineral extraction and chemical production.

The working class' special role in the construction of a new society was repeatedly stressed by congress speakers. It was announced that "the party adhered firmly to a working-class position in the long, hard and exceptionally laborious struggle and in the atmosphere of international difficulty." The main objective of the period of transition to socialism was the "constant reinforcement and improvement of the system of proletarian dictatorship."¹⁷

During the years since the Third LPRP Congress, the working class and all laborers in the republic have been extremely successful in the implementation of its decisions and the further construction of the foundations of a socialist society. At the end of 1983 there were already 217 enterprises in the state sector. The work of state enterprises was reorganized in 1983. Cost accounting and better bookkeeping methods were instituted. Most of the country's resources are now concentrated in the erection of small and medium-sized enterprises and workshops, which is expanding the geographic boundaries of production, extending it to small cities and rural areas and assigning priority to the use of local raw materials. Priority has also been assigned to the production of vital necessities. Such industries as power engineering, light industry and the woodworking industry are operating quite successfully. In 1983 alone, 181,000 cubic meters of wood, 57,000 cubic meters of lumber, 500,000 pieces of veneer, 11 million bricks, 82,000 tons of gypsum and 1.4 million meters of fabric were produced. Shops for the repair of tractors and agricultural machinery have been built in several locations.

Large enterprises are also being built in the country. A cement complex and a galvanized metal plant began operating in 1983. Several bridges were built on important roads, highway No 9 is being rebuilt, and design and surveying operations are being conducted on the oil pipeline route from Vientiane to the Vietnamese city of Binh. New villages are being established in the country. The working class is taking an active part in all of this.

The Soviet Union has aided the republic greatly in the establishment and development of its economy. During the years of the popular regime the USSR has aided Laos in the construction of two bridges, a hospital, a bulk plant, motor vehicle repair facilities, agricultural machine repair shops, an Inter-Sputnik satellite communication station and a meteorological station, the restoration of tin mining and the completion of several important geological

prospecting operations. The Soviet Union is aiding in the construction of highway No 9 and the erection of a polytechnical institute, a 150-bed hospital, a radio station, two bridges and a state farm and is supplying Laos with equipment and materials for three vocational and technical institutes, veterinary and meteorological services, an agricultural tekhnikum, soil science laboratories and other facilities.¹⁸ New detachments of a modern working class are taking shape on the construction sites of facilities being erected with the aid and support of the USSR. Hundreds of young men and women from Laos are being trained in vocational and technical institutes and tekhnikums in the Soviet Union.

The vanguard of the working class is the LPRP, which takes the position of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. From the very beginning, it had to perform the difficult and unfamiliar job of carrying the Marxist-Leninist ideology to the masses in a country where the majority of the population consists, in V. I. Lenin's words, "not of workers who have been through the school of capitalist factories and plants, but of typical representatives of the laboring masses and the exploited peasant masses suffering from medieval oppression."¹⁹ The LPRP was born and matured in a backward agrarian country with an underdeveloped economy, where the working class was relatively young and most of the party members came from the laboring peasantry. "We would certainly have strayed from the correct revolutionary path and would have departed from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism," K. Phomvihan said, "if we had not immediately secured the working class' leading role in relation to the peasantry and had not been guided by the Marxist-Leninist ideology as the only correct one."²⁰

The proletarian nature of the party was underscored in the LPRP political program adopted at the second party congress. "The Lao People's Revolutionary Party," the document says, "is a genuine Marxist-Leninist party of the working class, a highly organized vanguard and the supreme working-class organization in Laos."²¹ The fact that the LPRP is a working-class party was reaffirmed at its third congress.²²

In a discussion of LPRP policy, K. Phomvihan stressed: "Guided by the Leninist principles of the construction of the new type of proletarian party in Laos, we always regarded the reinforcement of its class nature as a key objective. This is the main step in the formation of a vanguard party." He then went on to say: "On the organizational level, the party paid close attention to the indoctrination, selection and party involvement of outstanding workers, peasants, fighters, intellectuals and members of other laboring strata of all nationalities who had withstood the ordeals of the revolutionary struggle. Special attention was given to the organization and indoctrination of workers and to their realization of their mission, for the purpose of laying a solid class foundation for the party."²³

Such factors as the growing strength of socialist forces in the world and the international communist and national liberation movements, the extensive spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the assistance of fraternal countries, especially the USSR and SRV, played an important part in the LPRP's successful leadership of the national-democratic revolution and its present guidance of

the people in the construction of socialist foundations. The leaders of the LPRP have always maintained that the revolution in Laos is an integral part of the revolution in Indochina and the world revolutionary process.²⁴ In addition to this, the revolution in Laos was the result of internal processes, giving birth to the party, strengthening it and thoroughly reflecting the needs and desires of workers, all laboring strata and the entire population. In a discussion of the dialectics of this phenomenon, K. Phomvihan said: "The party resolutely promoted international solidarity but also recognized that our country would have to rely primarily on its own abilities for its reformation and development and would have to make maximum use of its own inner potential. The party had strong faith in its people and their strength and was fully aware of its historic mission. It always believed that the revolution was being accomplished by the popular masses, that the revolution in Laos was the Lao people's own affair and that the revolutionary cause of the Lao people should be headed by the LPRP."²⁵

The creation of a strong alliance of workers and peasants under the guidance of the working class was exceptionally important in Laos. When the LPRP formed this alliance, it proceeded from the belief that the correct policy line, capable of mobilizing the peasants for a revolutionary struggle, was the main requirement for a working-class party. The party line with regard to the peasantry answered the inner needs of peasants and took the aims of the working class into account. The strong working-class alliance with the peasantry was the basis of the Laos revolution. "All revolutionary victories and the growth and consolidation of revolutionary forces," a report on the party political program at the Second LPRP Congress said, "are the result of our party's efforts to create and reinforce a working-class alliance with the peasantry and to mobilize the peasantry for a struggle for a new life and against the imperialist aggressors and their stooges--traitors to the motherland."²⁶ On the basis of this alliance, essentially signifying a dictatorship of workers and peasants under party leadership, popular government bodies have been successful in the institution of progressive socioeconomic reforms. The example of Laos confirms the profundity and historical validity of Lenin's belief that a people's revolution, "involving a real majority of the population in the movement, must include both the proletariat and the peasantry.... In the absence of this kind of alliance, democracy will be unstable and socialist reforms will be impossible."²⁷

The Lao Patriotic Front was renamed the Lao Front for National Construction in February 1979 because the situation in the country had changed radically and the united national front had new objectives. The functions of the new front included the unification and cohesion of all population strata around the LPRP and the popular government for the successful construction of a socialist society.

The working class also has its own mass organizations--trade unions. They were born in the early 1930's. Mutual assistance groups came into being in river transport services, the Vientiane power station and the Phonthiou tin mines. Their influence was particularly apparent at the time of the miners' demonstrations in Phonthiou in 1932 and 1933. In 1956 the first trade unions were organized in the liberated zone. National trade unions were established

by an LPRP Central Committee decision of 1 December 1966,³³ but the labor movement underwent its fullest development after the declaration of the LPDR. Almost all state establishments, plants, factories and construction sites now have their own primary trade-union organizations or groups. They unite over 50,000 members, or half of all the workers and employees in the country.

The first national congress of Laos trade unions on 14-16 December 1983 completed the formation of the mass labor organization. The congress stipulated that the trade unions of Laos should promote the growth of industrial production and capital construction, the improvement of communications and transportation, the expansion of trade and the development of education, public health care and consumer services. The report of the Central Executive Committee of the Lao Federation of Trade Unions said that the working class of Laos now represents 2 percent of all laborers in the country and produces 10 percent of its gross national income. "The cause of socialist revolution," the report said, "demands the rapid reinforcement and growth of the working class in the quantitative and qualitative respects so that it will be a true vanguard and revolutionary leader and make a decisive contribution to the socialist industrialization of the country and the construction of socialism."³⁴

This task is now being carried out successfully.

The history of the birth and development of the Laos working class proves that it has, in addition to its own specific features, the common features and developmental tendencies of the working class in other countries building a socialist society. The main ones are the guidance of a Marxist-Leninist party, an alliance with the peasantry, a vanguard role in the revolutionary struggle and fundamental socioeconomic reforms and the combination of patriotism with proletarian internationalism. These features make it the leader of the laboring strata and the entire population and guarantee its prestige within the country and in the international workers movement.

FOOTNOTES

1. PASASON, Vientiane, 16 December 1983.
2. PRAVDA, 22 October 1977.
9. "Laos. Spravochnik" [Handbook on Laos], p 145.
10. PASASON, 16 December 1983.
11. Quoted in: Kaysone Phomvihan, "Revolution in Laos: Some Basic Lessons and Chief Objectives," Moscow, 1980, p 174.
12. "Documents du Congres National des representants du peuple," Vientiane, 1976.
13. PRAVDA, 12 October 1977.
14. K. Phomvihan, Op. cit., pp 202-203.

15. "III s"yezd Narodno-revolutsionnoy partii Laosa" [Third LPRP Congress], Moscow, 1983, pp 13-14.
16. Ibid., pp 22-23.
17. Ibid., pp 18, 24.
18. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, 1983, No 49, p 20.
19. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 329.
20. K. Phomvihan, Op. cit., p 67.
21. Ibid., p 153.
22. "III s"yezd Narodno-revolutsionnoy partii Laosa," p 51.
23. Kaysone Phomvihan, "The Victory of Creative Marxism-Leninism in Laos," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1977, No 3, p 14.
24. See, for example, K. Phomvihan, "Revolution in Laos," p 141.
25. Ibid., p 149.
26. Ibid., p 65.
27. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 33, pp 39-40.
33. PASASON, 16 December 1983.
34. Ibid.

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Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

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CSO: 1807/137

CONTEMPORARY SIKH NATIONALISTIC COURSE IN PUNJAB VIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 20-28

[Article by K. Z. Ashrafyan: "Contemporary Sikh Nationalist Currents in Punjab"]

[Text] The development of bourgeois relations in present-day India has been accompanied by the growth of what is called regionalism but is essentially a form of local nationalism, on the level of the "linguistic" state, and of bourgeois and petty bourgeois nationalism.

Colonialism disrupted the establishment of capitalism in India: Bourgeois development here was "spotty" in the colonial era, and even in the post-colonial period to some extent. All of this, the substantial economic disparities and the differences in the sociopolitical development of different parts of the country led to the uneven development of various ethnic communities. This, in turn, gave rise to various forms of local nationalism (or "regionalism"). In a number of cases, the latter has primarily taken the form of secular sociopolitical currents, but in Punjab the regionalism of the local bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois strata has been dressed in the traditional garb of religious ideology, largely because contemporary capitalist relations began developing here later than in West India, Bengal, Tamil Nadu and several other parts of the country. The ideologists and leaders of regionalism in Punjab were religious leaders or the leaders of religious political parties.

Religious differences in Punjab, which were perpetuated during the period of English rule by colonial authorities who set some religious communities in opposition to others, are one of the main reasons why the nationalist movement in Punjab took religious forms. Punjab was directly affected by the religious division of India in 1947. Its western half, populated chiefly by Muslims, went over to Pakistan, while the eastern half, where Sikhs and Hindus were predominant, went over to India. The partition of the country, which was accompanied by mass resettlement and bloody internecine conflicts, had a severe effect on Punjab's economy and injured the emerging ethnic consciousness of the Punjabis. The attention of public figures and millions of common people was focused on the problem of religious differences. This mobilized the religious consciousness of the Sikhs, and the Sikh bourgeoisie in Punjab made use of this for its own political and social purposes.

We should call the Sikh regionalist current quasi-nationalism, because the Sikhs, in spite of the communalist aims of the Sikh religious leaders who put forth "national" demands, are not a separate nationality. After the declaration of India's independence, Sikh quasi-nationalism went through two main stages of development. The first covered the period from the beginning of the 1950's to the middle of the 1960's, a period connected with the movement to establish a separate Punjabi linguistic state. The Sikh bourgeoisie, including petty bourgeois strata, was led by the Akali Dal, the political party acting as the ideologist of Sikh quasi-nationalism.

The Akali Dal--"detachment (or party) of the immortal (God)"¹--was founded in 1925 after the suppression of the antifeudal and anticolonial movement and has always been the party of the Sikh bourgeoisie, primarily in rural areas, including embourgeoisied landowners and the rural jati elite (the main land-owning caste in Punjab). During the struggle for the Punjabi linguistic state, the petty bourgeois substratum in the Akali Dal grew much stronger and represented, just as it does now, most of the members of the party.

The party leadership has always been controlled by the more wealthy bourgeois strata, connected with commercial farming and capitalist production in rural areas. In the cities the Akali Dal was supported in the 1950's and 1960's, just as it is now, by Sikhs from the middle strata--middle and small businessmen, merchants, functionaries, intellectuals and taxi owners.

In 1966, after part of Punjab became the new state of Haryana, the second stage in the development of Sikh quasi-nationalism began in connection with the struggle for "autonomy," which was given an extremely broad interpretation. The Akali Dal conference in Anandpur in 1973 put forth the slogan of "autonomy" as a policy aim and insisted that the central government retain only functions connected with defense, foreign relations, the circulation of money and transportation and that all other prerogatives be turned over to the state government.

The demand for "autonomy" dramatically exacerbated relations between the Akali Dal and the ruling Indian National Congress and caused the Akalists to form a political alliance with forces opposing the Congress, particularly the Jana Sangh Party. During the state of emergency in the middle of the 1970's, Sikh shrines turned into centers of anti-Congress propaganda. After forming a coalition with the Janata Party in the parliamentary elections in April 1977, the Akali Dal, which ran on the slogan of "autonomy" in the spirit of Anandpur,² received two ministerial posts (agriculture and education) in M. Desai's cabinet after the elections. The same coalition won the elections to the legislative assembly of the state of Punjab, where the new government was headed by Akalist leader P. S. Badall. The Akali Dal's hope that the demand for "autonomy" would be satisfied turned out, however, to be groundless. In spite of several Akalist demarches, the Janata Party government made no move to keep its campaign promises. The fall of Desai's cabinet in summer 1979 and the victory of the INC(I) party in the special parliamentary elections in January 1980 caused the Akalists to lose their newly won influence in the center. In May 1980 elections to the Punjab legislative assembly put a Congress government in power in this state as well. These political defeats led to a new outburst of Sikh quasi-nationalism in the beginning of the 1980's.

Taking various forms ("autonomism" and unconcealed separatism), Sikh quasi-nationalism made use of India's economic and social difficulties.

From the late 1950's to the early 1980's Punjab was the site of a "green revolution." The expansion of irrigated farming and the more extensive use of modern equipment (mechanical plows, threshers and electric pumps) and high-quality seeds led to the intensification of agriculture and heightened its productivity. Punjab, which provides India with 73 percent of its wheat and 48 percent of its rice, deserves its reputation as the national granary. The state's economic successes can be judged from the fact that it has the highest annual per capita income in the country (2,642 rupees, as compared to the national average of 1,537). It also has the highest minimum wage for agricultural workers, the highest level of power consumption in the country,³ and the most highly developed network of roads.⁴

Of course, this does not mean that there is no poverty in the state, particularly in rural areas, where 17 percent of the population lives below the poverty level and the average person's daily calorie intake is just over half the norm. The poor in rural Punjab are mainly landless agricultural workers and indentured or semi-indentured farmhands. Their number has increased rapidly during the process of the capitalist transformation of rural areas, accompanied by the ruin of small landowners, the intensification of usurious exploitation and the decline of agricultural prices. The influx of manpower from regions of less intensive farming--Uttar Pradesh and Bihar--heightens competition in the Punjab labor market (where there is essentially a surplus of manpower). Not only does this allow rich farmers to lower the pay of farmhands and exploit the landless, but many Indian authors have noted the appearance of new forms of "slavery" during the years of the "green revolution." "Dependent labor is predominant" in several parts of the state, particularly the Sirhind district.⁵

The "green revolution" has not benefited small farmers either. Between 1970/72 and 1976/77 the number of farms with less than a hectare of cultivated land, representing an intermediate link between larger farms and the landless, increased (from 517,000 to 637,000). This was accompanied by the further concentration of land.⁶

Under the conditions of inadequate industrial development (in 1982 only 15 percent of the cotton and 13.4 percent of the sugar cane grown in Punjab was processed in this state, and there is essentially no heavy industry in Punjab), the capitalist transformation of rural areas freed substantial human resources and caused huge numbers of people to move to the cities, where they cannot make a living. The absence of the necessary industrial base is also inhibiting the development of the "green revolution." The further development of commercial agriculture is limited by the shortage of water⁷ and, what is most important, electricity. The electricity shortage is so acute that some people even believe that "energy policy" lies at the basis of Sikh regionalism.

All of these problems have created an atmosphere of severe social tension in Punjab, and Sikh leaders are taking advantage of this.

The conflicting interests of various social groups of the Sikh community led to a struggle within the Akali Dal. At the end of the 1970's there were two factions in the party--"moderates" and "radicals," making up the factions known as the "ministerialists" (headed by the former chief minister of the state of Punjab, P. S. Badall) and the "organizationalists," led by then President of the Akali Dal J. S. Talwandi. The struggle became more intense during the preparations for the special elections to parliament (January 1980). The "ministerialists," who wanted a campaign alliance with the Janata Party, were severely criticized by the party Working Committee and many petty bourgeois Sikh organizations, accusing P. S. Badall of wanting to "sell" the Jana Sangh Party.⁸ But the "ministerialists," who had a majority in the Punjab legislative assembly (43 of 57 seats) and won the support of Sikh religious leaders, were able to get their own way and form a campaign coalition with the Janata Party.

In January 1980 this coalition suffered a crushing defeat in the national elections. The Akalists suffered their next defeat in the May 1980 elections to the state legislative assembly. With a view to the influence of Communists in Punjab, especially in rural areas, the Akali Dal formed a campaign alliance with them. This tactic was proposed by the Talwandi faction. In spite of the differing class natures of the Communists and the Akali Dal and the differences in their ideological aims, socioeconomic programs and methods of struggle, their campaign alliance was justified by the number of small farmers in the social base of both parties, and both parties demanded a change for the better in their status.

The defeats led to the further exacerbation of the factional struggle. The Akali Dal now consists of several different factions. The Badall faction is the most moderate and has been most consistent in representing the interests of the Sikh bourgeoisie. Petty bourgeois and more extremist elements have rallied round the Talwandi and Tohra groups. The group of Akali Dal President H. S. Longowal holds the "centrist" position in the party.

In general, the beginning of the 1980's was marked by the "radicalization" of all Akalist leaders and Akalist quasi-nationalism as a whole. The Akali Dal relies heavily on low-level divisions headed by "jathadars" (this was the name given to detachment leaders, "jatha," in the military groups of the Sikh religious community, "Khalsa," in the 18th and 19th centuries), and on the committee controlling the "gurdwaras" (Sikh temples or shrines)--(Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandak Committee--SGPC)--which began controlling gurdwara income at the beginning of the 1920's, after driving out the feudalized administrators, mahants, who had collaborated with English colonial authorities. In time, the Akali Dal gained supreme influence in the SGPC, which contributes the lion's share of gurdwara income to the party's campaign fund. The SGPC's huge budget of 2.5 billion rupees allows the committee to maintain dozens or hundreds of schools, colleges and hospitals and to finance the activities of an entire army of missionaries. As a religious institution, however, the SGPC is elected by a direct vote of all the Sikhs every 5 years. The elections to the committee, which has been headed by G. S. Tohra for the last few years, are usually quite heated and full of political slogans. Any move to restrict the rights and prerogatives of the SGPC is called "persecution of the Sikhs";

anyone guilty of this unscrupulous behavior is referred to by the ignominious term "massarangar" ("persecutor"). Now that the gurdwaras have turned into political rostrums, the Akali Dal has an incentive to establish total control over their activity.

In recent years Indian statesmen and politicians have justifiably accused gurdwara functionaries of sheltering criminals, extremists and terrorists from the police. The attempts of the authorities to apprehend these individuals have aroused the anger of Sikh leaders. On 2 August 1983 in Amritsar, party leaders issued an appeal to all Sikhs in the world to oppose the government's attempts to abolish the "democratic system" existing in the SGPC since the 1920's and "establish its own control" over the gurdwaras.⁹

The mobilization of religious feelings on behalf of bourgeois and petty bourgeois quasi-nationalism has been quite "productive" for many Sikh leaders. It is significant that 75 percent of the population of Punjab consists of illiterate laborers with no complete awareness of their class interests and objectives.

The Akali Dal's influence among the Sikh masses is also secured by the support of the Akal Taht (literally "throne of the immortal [god]"), a body headed by "five elders"--"panj piara," performing the functions of a Sikh "synod." The decisions of the "five elders" are compulsory for parties and party leaders as well as for all Sikhs. From time to time the "five elders" issue religious verdicts or "ukases" ("khukmama"), prohibiting various social and political actions (for example, they prohibited communication with "dissidents"--"nirankari," the adherents of the modernist current in Sikhism, which is alien to Akalist political aims and supports the Congress (I) in elections).

The Akal Taht also sentences politicians: In 1961, by a decision of the high priests, Tara Singh had to wash dishes in a public dining room, "langar," and polish the shoes of people who came to the Golden Temple in Amritsar; the same sentence was handed down in 1979 against J. S. Talwandi, the leader of one Akali Dal faction, who was accused of "tankhaya" ("disobedience"), tantamount to excommunication for willfulness and insubordination to the "synod." The authority of the "five elders" is incontestable for the Sikhs, including party leaders, but the elders usually make their decisions in accordance with the wishes of the most influential political group in the Akali Dal.

The Akali Dal's image as a "panth party" ("panth" literally means "path, "teaching" or "religion") stems from its connection with religious institutions and from the communal ideology it preaches, based on the thesis that "the Sikhs are a separate nationality." In an attempt to deny the accusations of communalism, Akalist leader H. S. Longowal has repeatedly stated that the Punjabi word "kaum" should not be translated as "nationality" and that it should not be assumed that the Sikhs are separating themselves from the rest of the Indians. But these statements have not been very convincing because the Sikh religious community is viewed by Akalist leaders as a social and political community.

The Akali Dal leadership tries to strengthen its influence among the masses by using slogans calculated to appeal to them. For example, the Akali Dal

campaign manifesto for the parliamentary elections in January 1980 spoke of the party's adherence to the principles of "a secular, democratic and socialist society in the spirit of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind"--the two most highly respected Sikh dogmatists, who lived, respectively, in the 15th and early 16th centuries and in the 17th and early 18th centuries. It also noted the party's desire to improve the status of "oppressed" strata and oppose "the accumulation of economic and political power by capitalists" and mentioned the need to stimulate the development of heavy industry in the state, particularly in the public sector.¹⁰

Portraying itself as a "peasant party," the Akali Dal supports the slogan of "fair prices" (that is, the demand for higher purchase prices for agricultural products), a slogan popular among farmers, including small farmers, and asserts that credit should be extended to farmers on better terms and that favorable conditions should be established for the development of commercial farming (in particular, new markets for commercial grain).

In fact, however, the Akali Dal does not want truly democratic reforms in rural areas and opposes the distribution of surplus land to the peasants. This has led to confrontations with the Congress (I) Party and with leftist forces. The Akalist agrarian "program" is confined to the demand for the constitutional acknowledgement of special "Sikh rights" and the repeal of the constitutionally recorded "Hindu rights" for the Sikhs, in accordance with which property, including land, is divided among all heirs, regardless of their gender. This law, as H. S. Longowal said in an interview in Amritsar on 15 June 1983, is contrary to Sikh customs, as is the "Hindu marriage law."¹¹ Striving for the acknowledgement of "special rights" for the Sikhs, he sent a letter to members of parliament. A special Akali Dal commission in Jalandhar drafted two "Sikh laws" (on inheritance and marriage), which were supposed to be approved first by the Akali Dal and then sent "to the center" for discussion. Both of the "Sikh laws" are devoid of any democratic content whatsoever. They are designed to prevent the fragmentation of large farms: The right to inherit property is granted only to men (a woman can only share her husband's property). As for the Sikh law on marriage, particularly the custom of "chadar andazi," it stipulates that a widow must marry one of her husband's brothers (older or younger) but that he will not leave his other family. The children of the woman's first marriage will inherit the property of their deceased father, while the children of the new marriage will share the property of their new father, their uncle. All of this, according to G. S. Tira, the Akali Dal's legal counsel, is supposed to prevent the fragmentation of land holdings.¹² Of course, this tradition cannot protect the farm of a small Jat peasant from ruin because the main determining factors here are the unprofitability of the small farm, high overhead costs, low agricultural prices, debts owed to usurers and high taxes.

Autonomy in the broad sense of the term was the Akalists' central demand in the 1970's and early 1980's. The Akali Dal manifesto for the parliamentary elections in January 1980 spoke of the need to secure "a proper place in Indian politics for ethnic minorities" and broader autonomy for the states with the retention of the federal structure of the republic. The Akali Dal leadership repeatedly expressed support for the slogan of autonomy in the

spirit of the separatist resolution of the 1973 Anandpur conference. The Communist Party of India, advocating the democratization of government by means of broader powers for the states, resolutely condemned this slogan because this kind of autonomy would injure the national interests and unity of India.

The Akali Dal put forth its demands, in the words of its leader, H. S. Longowal, dozens of times. In particular, they were set forth by the Akali Dal leader in a talk with journalists, reported from Amritsar on 25 June 1983, and included the following points: 1) the "lawful and constitutional" resolution of the controversy over the use of the water of the Ravi and Beas rivers by Punjab and neighboring states; 2) the immediate transfer of Chandigarh, which is now the capital of two states, Haryana and Punjab, "only to Punjab"; 3) the creation of a "linguistic commission" (to determine Punjabi-speaking territories within the boundaries of Haryana); 4) the publication of a national act on gurdwaras, defining the status of these Sikh temples in accordance with the wishes of the Sikh religious leadership; 5) the authorization of radio broadcasts of Sikh services from the Golden Temple and the declaration of Amritsar a "holy city"; 6) the renaming of the "Delhi-Amritsar Express" the "Golden Temple Express"; 7) the acknowledgement of Punjabi as the second language in districts bordering on Punjab in the states of Haryana, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and the union territory of Delhi; 8) the granting of autonomy to Punjab in accordance with the Anandpur resolution.

The Akali Dal leader declared that his party would continue the fight until the just "treatment of Punjabis" should triumph. In an attempt to attain this goal in August 1982, the Akali Dal announced a year of "agitation" ("morcha"), presupposing the organization of a campaign of "non-violent non-cooperation," sabotage, demonstrations and other forms of protest. A year later, Longowal issued an appeal for an "ardas divas" ("day of prayer") on 4 August 1983 to mark the anniversary of the morcha. He also announced that the morcha, also called a "holy war" ("dharam udh"), would continue until the government accepted "Sikh demands."¹³ Akali Dal leaders issued an ultimatum: If the government should not accept the Sikh demands by 21 February 1983, all of the Akalists (37) in the parliament and legislative assembly of Punjab would resign. Later, however, the Akalist leaders broke off negotiations with the government and announced a "new program" of struggle for "Sikh rights."

The "mainspring" of the program was the mobilization of a 100,000-strong volunteer corps, "shahidi jatha," to "resist the police" under the slogan "sirjiware" ("do or die").¹⁴ The actual number of volunteers would be difficult to estimate. According to H. S. Longowal, the volunteers would not be silent observers of "oppression"; he did not deny that they would be carrying weapons, which, in the words of the Akalist leader, is "part of Sikh tradition." The majority of the first volunteers were young followers of J. S. Bhindranwale, the former head of the militant Sikh Nikhang Order.

The mobilization of the "shahidi jatha" volunteers and the Nikhang terrorist actions evoked retaliatory actions by Hindu militant groups in Punjab--the "Suraksha Sena" and "Hindu Sangthan." This resulted in occasional armed communalist demonstrations in the state, often accompanied by battles and killings, even on religious holidays.¹⁵

As the date of the new elections to the parliament (January 1985) and legislative assembly of the state draws near, the "Akalist agitation" is being intensified and is acquiring the features of a campaign fight. The destabilization of state affairs has become a way of clearing the path to power. The emotional speeches about "discrimination against Sikhs," the center's "indifference" and "apathy" toward Punjab and the "difficult position of the common man" conceal the political interests of the Akalist leadership. The Akali Dal leaders were so ambitious that they denied the very possibility of any kind of campaign political alliance. When Jasadev Singh Jassowal, a member of the Punjab legislative assembly from the Congress (I) Party, asked about the possibility of a future coalition made up of his party and the Akali Dal, H. S. Longowal declined the suggestion, stating that the Congress (I) "discriminated" against Punjab. "We will take power through a popular mandate," the "marcha dictator" said.¹⁶ When I. Gandhi met with Akalist leaders in February 1984, however, it became obvious that the possibility of a new round of talks between the Akali Dal and the Indian Government about the "Sikh demands" could not be excluded. There was also a definite tendency toward more pronounced differences between the views of the Akali Dal and religious extremists, particularly J. S. Bhindranwale: His tactic of terror and the fueling of religious chauvinism was frequently criticized by "moderate" Akali Dal leaders, including H. S. Longowal.¹⁷

The bourgeois opposition to the Congress (I) Party, especially the Bharatiya Janata Party, which is now aspiring to the status of a "national alternative" to the Congress (I), is naturally taking advantage of the current situation in Punjab. This party constituted the nucleus of the ruling Akala Dal-Janata Party coalition in Punjab in 1977-1979. By escalating tension in Punjab, the bourgeois opposition to the Congress (I) Party hopes to weaken the government's positions in the state and in the entire country.

The Akali Dal's "autonomism," as mentioned above, is only one of the currents, even if the prevailing one, in Sikh quasi-nationalism. The openly separatist extremist "movement for Khalistan," with the aim of creating a buffer Sikh state between Pakistan and India, has been another of its currents since the beginning of the 1980's. This movement was inspired by the upper echelon of Sikh emigre communities in Europe and America. Most of its members are businessmen who want to invest capital in their "native" Punjab. In 1972, when Indo-Pakistani relations were dramatically exacerbated by the struggle for the creation of Bangladesh, Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a former Akalist leader and minister in Punjab who was later expelled from the Akali Dal, made a trip to Iran to establish the "Khalistan" radio station there. After he had emigrated, Chauhan declared himself the "president of the republic of Khalistan" in 1982.

The idea of Khalistan has been actively promoted by Ganga Singh Dhillon, a citizen of the United States and a businessman in the international tourist industry. In March 1981, as the chairman of a conference on Sikh education convened in India by the head divan of the Khalsa, he issued a demand for the creation of Khalistan and the granting of UN membership status to it. In April of the same year, J. S. Chauhan and G. S. Dhillon organized a "conference" in New York to support the demand for Khalistan and to "prevent the annihilation of the Sikh nationality." The "conference" requested the United Nations to

accept Khalistan as a UN member or to grant it "consultative status" (according to information received from the Indian permanent representative to the United Nations, the request was denied). At the beginning of November 1981, a news report from London said that J. S. Chauhan was establishing an "International Council of Sikhs" in London to issue another appeal to the United Nations to grant this organization the status of a "non-governmental organization."¹⁸

Chauhan's widely publicized plans included the establishment of Khalistan delegations in several countries in Europe and America (the first "consulate" was to be opened in Frankfurt-am-Main in the FRG) and the creation and training, with U.S. assistance, of a "strong army" of 10,000 for Khalistan. A special fund, the "Nankana Sahib Foundation," with the official aim of supporting Sikh gurdwaras in Pakistan and India, was set up in the United States to finance separatist actions; its directors are two U.S. congressmen and its president is G. S. Dhillon.

Western imperialist groups with an incentive to destabilize and divide India, which is playing an increasingly important role in world politics, sympathized with the movement for Khalistan and even inspired it. A report compiled by J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. representative to the United Nations, after her trip to India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan in August 1981 said: "India's weakness consists in many unsolved domestic and international problems: In addition to endemic poverty, there is the gradual growth of the separatist movement, and on a scale indicating the real possibility of the Balkanization of India, which will destroy its influence in the Third World and everywhere else."¹⁹

By spring 1981, "Khalistani" stamps, printed in Vancouver, passports signed by "President" J. S. Chauhan and five-dollar bills signed by the director of the "Khalistan Reserve Bank" began to be circulated in Punjab.²⁰ The leaders of the separatist movement in Punjab were furnished with them. The movement here is led by organizations banned by the government--the Dal Khalsa (literally, the Khalsa's army), which was the youth wing of the Akali Dal until 1979, the Indian Federation of Sikh Students (IFSS) and the National Khalistan Council.

Some segments of Sikh urban middle strata sympathized with the extremists' campaign: educated youths and the employees of government and private establishments and enterprises facing the acute shortage of jobs in the state. They object to the government's regulation of the ethnic and religious composition of the civil service: In recent years this has reduced the disproportionately high percentage of Sikhs in the army and civil service. The Jati Sikhs in cities (their number is increasing as a result of the progressive fragmentation of land holdings) are also dissatisfied with the government's policy of reserving jobs for untouchables.

The separatists from the Dal Khalsa and IFSS are striving to broaden their mass base by stimulating religious feelings. One of their tactics consists in provoking religious conflicts (for example, they organized the "anti-tobacco campaign"--demanding the prohibition of the tobacco trade near the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the trade of Hindu merchants); they have established close contacts with respected religious leaders--zealots of religious orthodoxy.

In September 1981 the separatists hijacked an Indian Boeing-737 passenger plane, forcing it to land in Lahore (Pakistan); their only demand was the release of J. S. Bhindranwale, the Sikh fanatic, instigator of Sikh extremism and head of the Nikhang Order who was arrested by the authorities in connection with the assassination of journalist L. J. Narayna, who had repeatedly opposed the idea of Khalistan.²¹ The leader of the IFSS issued an ultimatum, stating that the failure to release the "saint" would result in terrorist actions ("gherao") against officials.²²

Indian politicians have repeatedly directed attention to the illegal importation of weapons to Punjab and the distribution of these weapons by the Dal Khalsa to its young followers. Increasingly frequent terrorist incidents, public disturbances and threats against public spokesmen and politicians forced the government to take a number of extreme measures: On 19 July 1983 the arrest of 1,100 members of the Dal Khalsa, National Council and other extremist elements was reported from Delhi. Some of the extremists, according to local authorities, took shelter in gurdwaras.²³ On 6 October 1983 the government instituted a state of presidential law in Punjab, but this did not put an end to the acts of sabotage, violence and terrorism. Sikh disturbances and religious conflicts are taking place in rural areas as well as cities. A new outburst of friction and armed conflicts broke out in the state in May 1984. The Indian Government had to set a curfew in some cities and take additional measures to secure law and order in Punjab.

In view of the fact that the actions of Sikh extremists were jeopardizing the life and well-being of citizens and posed a threat to Indian unity, the republic government decided to vacate the Golden Temple in Amritsar of the terrorists lying in ambush there, and government troops took the temple by storm on 7 June 1984. The bodies of J. S. Bhindranwale and IFSS President Bhai Amrik Singh were found among the dead. The situation in the state was normalized by the government's actions, which were supported by the public and by political parties.

"Autonomism" and separatism have been separate currents, independent of one another, in Sikh quasi-nationalism in the 1980's. In spite of the official condemnation of separatism by moderate Akalists, this has not kept some of them from "sliding" to extremes. The mounting religious extremism is being used by "moderate regionalists" as a means of pressuring the Indian Government. The Indian journalists who have stated that the implementation of the demands of "autonomists" taking the position of the Anandpur resolution could lead to the de facto establishment of Khalistan cite convincing arguments in support of this view.²⁴

Sikh quasi-nationalism, however, can continue to exist under the conditions of all the unsolved ethnic, linguistic, economic and social problems, the stable religious feelings of the masses and the chauvinism of conservative Hindu communal parties and organizations. Without aiding in the resolution of Punjab's economic and social problems, Sikh quasi-nationalism is discouraging public participation in the nationwide democratic movement for continued progress and for stronger sovereignty and unity and is objectively playing into the hands of imperialism and neocolonialism, which are striving to

destabilize the internal situation in India for the purpose of reducing its influence in international politics and changing its foreign policy line.

FOOTNOTES

1. The literal meaning of "Akali" is "immortal," one of the epithets used in reference to the Sikh absolute god.
2. H. S. Oberoi, "Moderate-Extremist Distinction False," THE TIMES OF INDIA, 1 June 1938, p 6.
3. Energy consumption in 1981 was 66 times as great as in 1947. See S. S. Showla, "Severe Power Deficit Forecast for Punjab," THE INDIAN EXPRESS, 20 October 1981, p 5.
4. J. D. Singh, "Where Punjab Leads Other States," THE TIMES OF INDIA, 28 July 1983, p 7.
5. THE TIMES OF INDIA, 9 April 1981, p 5.
6. Y. S. Gill, "The Growing Pauperization of the Peasantry," NEW AGE, 10 January 1982, p 3.
7. According to P. S. Badall, former Akali Dal leader and chief minister of Punjab, the state is not getting "its fair share" of the water from the Ravi and Beas rivers, which also irrigate land in the neighboring states of Haryana and Rajasthan. As a result of this, hundreds of thousands of acres of land remained uncultivated, for example, in 1983.
8. THE STATESMAN, 24 December 1979, p 9; PATRIOT, 14 December 1979, p 1.
9. THE TIMES OF INDIA, 3 August 1983, p 1.
10. Ibid., 21 December 1979, p 9.
11. Ibid., 16 June 1983, p 11.
12. Ibid., 13 August 1983, p 5.
13. Ibid., 26 June 1983, p 1; 31 July 1983, p 7. Some of the Sikh religious demands were accepted by the government as early as February 1983. A year later, at a session of the Congress (I) Parliamentary Group before the budget session of the parliament, I. Gandhi also announced the authorization of daily hour-and-a-half broadcasts from the Golden Temple (THE STATESMAN, 23 February 1984, p 1).
14. H. S. Oberoi, Op. cit., p 4.
15. NEW AGE, 22 May 1983, p 5; THE TIMES OF INDIA, 26 June 1983, p 1; 27 June 1983, p 7.

16. THE NATIONAL HERALD, 24 April 1983, p 4.
17. INDIA TODAY, 29 February 1984, pp 31-32.
18. THE TIMES OF INDIA, 14 November 1982, p 7.
19. LINK, 27 February 1983.
20. THE TIMES OF INDIA, 10 September 1981, p 7.
21. Ibid., p 6; THE STATESMAN, 23 February 1984, p 1.
22. THE INDIAN EXPRESS, 12 October 1981, p 1; 27 October 1981.
23. THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, 20 July 1983, p 1.
24. THE TIMES OF INDIA, 16 June 1983, p 8.

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CSO: 1807/137

OL'DENBURG'S CAREER MODEL OF RELEVANCE IN EASTERN STUDIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 65-69

[Article by Ye. M. Primakov: "Academician S. F. Ol'denburg and the Development of Soviet Oriental Studies"; based on a report presented by Academician Ye. M. Primakov at a meeting in memory of S. F. Ol'denburg in April 1984]

[Text] The passage of time highlights certain individuals who have played a special role in the development of science. As a rule, these are not the people who make brilliant discoveries in various fields of science, although there would be no scientific progress at all without these discoveries. As a rule, these are individuals who might be a cut below the brilliant ones and might be just talented scientists rather than geniuses, but they are people with truly colossal and unique scientific organizational abilities, remarkable erudition and, what is most important, a unique gift for looking into the future of their science and seeing the mainstream of its development. In Oriental studies, Sergey Fedorovich Ol'denburg was this kind of individual.

It is completely obvious that an outstanding organizer in science must first have the necessary political qualities--intolerance for anything obsolete or reactionary. He cannot lock himself up within the walls of an academic cell like a hermit or view revolutionary storms and upheavals as an uninvolved bystander. The political requirements of a scientific organizer include patriotism and the willingness to place all of his talent and all of his ability at the service of the people. This kind of patriotism must, however, be organically combined with internationalism and a broadminded approach to the development of science and its role in human society. Sergey Fedorovich Ol'denburg was distinguished precisely by these political features of a captain of science.

Academician V. A. Gordlevskiy, the renowned Oriental and Turkish scholar, had this to say about the days of the October Revolution: "We must frankly admit that part of the intelligentsia supported the new regime, part sabotaged it and part waited to see what would happen."¹ S. F. Ol'denburg waited just a few weeks before making his final choice: He supported the new popular regime. "In these difficult and complex times," he said at the annual meeting of the Academy of Sciences on 29 December 1918, "many are inclined to lose heart and do not understand the grand changes that are taking place in all countries, among all peoples, changes which are extremely painful and

agonizing but are nevertheless grand and remarkable."² These words leave no doubts about which side of the barricades Ol'denburg and the overwhelming majority of outstanding Russian scientists were on after the end of the October Revolution. After the victory of Great October, President A. P. Karpinskiy of the Academy of Sciences and the academy's permanent secretary, S. F. Ol'denburg, not only announced their consent to cooperate with the new regime but also began cooperating with it in earnest.

Ol'denburg's meetings with the great Lenin played an important role in the formation of his view of the world. Vladimir Il'ich's remarkable erudition, his deep realization of the exceptionally important value of science in the socialist society, his statements about the need for scientists to stay abreast of life and to carry knowledge to the people and, finally, Lenin's tact and his sincere interest in scientists left an indelible impression on Ol'denburg.

There is no question that Sergey Fedorovich Ol'denburg had considerable productive influence on the activities of the entire Academy of Sciences before the revolution and, what is most important, immediately afterward. But he made a particularly outstanding contribution to the consistent progress of Soviet Oriental studies. The person who reads S. F. Ol'denburg's thoughts and ideas 50 years after his death will be amazed by the undying significance of his views on the essence of Oriental studies and the main guidelines, forms and methods of the development of this field of science. The interdisciplinary, comprehensive nature of Oriental studies and the need for analyses of all aspects of ancient, medieval and even modern Eastern societies are underscored in Academician S. F. Ol'denburg's discussions, statements and assessments. Furthermore, he did not believe that the researcher should simply follow the path of "traditional" or "classical" studies, but should strive for the more intensive inclusion of the economic affairs, contemporary history, social-class struggle and politics of Eastern countries in the research process.

In this connection, let us examine some statements by Sergey Fedorovich, which sound as if they had been expressed by a person with a passionate interest in the future of Soviet Oriental studies not half a century ago, but in our own time, today. According to Academician Ol'denburg, "we must replace the old school of Oriental studies, with its largely foregone conclusions, interest in the past and little concern for the present, with our new Soviet school of Oriental studies. Here we will assign priority to economics, to the study of all contemporary revolutionary and agrarian movements and the agrarian revolution and to the thorough study of the class struggle in the past and present, and always on the basis of primary sources in the Eastern and Western languages."³

The idea of the need to develop economic research was expressed quite consistently in S. F. Ol'denburg's statements and works. Of course, this refrain was no coincidence. There were virtually no analyses of economic and socio-economic processes in prerevolutionary Oriental studies. The further development of the theory of Oriental studies and its coordination with political practices would have been impossible, however, without this exceptionally important field of research. "The old school of Oriental studies," he wrote,

paid almost no attention to economic affairs, but now everyone realizes the exceptional importance of these in theory and practice. The insufficient economic background of old workers and the shortage of new workers are making the work on this front quite slow at present, because economic analyses are exceptionally crucial and demand the proper background. We must concentrate on this."⁴

Of course, in his view of Oriental studies as a science covering the present as well as the past and becoming an organic element of actual practices, Sergey Fedorovich did not confine himself to appeals for more sweeping and detailed economic analyses. He believed that much of the "classical" cycle of Oriental studies--linguistics and the study of Eastern literatures and cultures--should also be reorganized with a view to the present. The vigorous national construction in the eastern Soviet republics in the late 1920's and early 1930's made this particularly pertinent. "Oriental scholars in the Soviet Union have always paid close attention to national cultures," S. F. Ol'denburg wrote. "The scientific bases the Academy of Sciences is now establishing in the republics should display maximum energy in this field because the combined efforts of local scientists, with their considerable local experience, and of scientists in the center, with their special training in the fundamentals of theory, will be particularly productive."⁵

"The main thing in the correct development of our Oriental studies...is the same as in the development of all Soviet science: its closer contact with real life and, what is most important for the social sciences, the study of the present day, the contemporary era, for the purpose of influencing it correctly in the interests of socialist construction." These words were also written by Academician Ol'denburg.⁶

Sergey Fedorovich Ol'denburg was one of the first to boldly and resolutely advocate collective efforts by Oriental scholars. In an account of his memories of S. F. Ol'denburg, Academician V. M. Alekseyev wrote: "It appeared that he was completely against the tendency of the scientist to submerge himself in his office, in his project, in his papers which had been lying around the office for decades after they had brought in from the East and were worked on separately, often in unrelated bunches."⁷ And here is what S. F. Ol'denburg said about himself: "I always knew the weaknesses of scientific methods in the humanities and the coincidental and fragmented nature of the work by scientists in this field, and it seemed to me that organized work, the planning and compilation of collective projects, might be more important in this field than the work of an individual. This almost always means the abandonment of many personal projects, particularly for us in the humanities."⁸

This progressive view of the scientist's work, of the scientific method without which the development of Oriental studies would be unthinkable even today, was resisted, and is still being resisted, by those whom Academician Alekseyev called "anarchic individualists." The development of Oriental studies, however, has not corresponded to their plans or to their individualistic interests.

It is not surprising that such outstanding contemporaries of S. F. Ol'denburg as academician-Oriental scholars V. M. Alekseyev, M. Ya. Marr and I. Yu. Krachkovskiy not only regarded him as the inspirer and organizer of the

"broader interpretation" of Oriental studies, but also supported Sergey Fedorovich's ideas about the reorganization of this science, which led to the elimination of the artificial confinement of Oriental studies to Eastern philology, linguistics and literature, and sometimes ethnography and ancient history.

In spite of the fact that each of the abovementioned scientists, who were truly great in their field, had an obvious interest in the "classical" cycle of Oriental studies, all of them realized the exceptional importance of S. F. Ol'denburg's reforming activity in this field of science. After Sergey Fedorovich died, V. M. Alekseyev even expressed the fear that "the Oriental studies complex seems inclined to fall apart once again." But the same V. M. Alekseyev took a realistic look at the changes which had already taken place in the sphere of Oriental studies during Ol'denburg's lifetime, with his help and under his guidance, and wrote: "The new Oriental scholars who enter this field of science with their own view of the world, and do not passively accept all scientific information, will certainly form an absolutely new front for scientific conquests."⁹

These words turned out to be prophetic.

Therefore, Academician Ol'denburg expressed new views which were of vital importance in the reorganization of our science and played a tremendous role in the development of Soviet Oriental studies. He was also able to become an outstanding organizer of Oriental studies because he was exceptionally tactful in his work with his colleagues, especially young scientists. He taught them without any preaching, gave them advice without annoying them, corrected them without offending them, and gave young scientists the benefit of his rich experience, knowledge, thoughts and ideas without detracting from their individual qualities. This is precisely why, in Academician V. M. Alekseyev's words, "Sergey Fedorovich apparently had no enemies or opponents among the young scientists."¹⁰ He also called Academician Ol'denburg a man who "despised routine and scholasticism."

S. F. Ol'denburg resolutely incorporated his opinions and convictions in his work. From 1904 until the day of his death, he was the permanent administrator of the country's largest center of Oriental studies--first the Asian Museum, and later the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, founded in 1930 with the museum as its core.

We are accustomed to speaking of the Asian Museum as an exceptionally important center of Oriental studies. And it is true that it was not merely a museum; it was also a research organization where scholars investigated major topics in Oriental studies. The museum itself was not ordinary either. It was the most impressive repository of manuscripts, xylographs, books and newspapers, which were studied and analyzed by Russian scholars and their foreign colleagues. Few people know, however, that the Asian Museum had a staff of only two or three people, and that there were only seven people on the staff at the time of the Great October Revolution.

After the triumph of Great October, the situation in the museum changed radically. During the first years of the Soviet regime its collection of

manuscripts was augmented considerably by materials from the combat zones of the Caucasian and southwestern fronts, where scholars went during the war years to save cultural monuments. The Asian Museum also received the collections of the Winter Palace and the academic division of the former Russian Foreign Ministry's Asian Department. In addition to this, Eastern manuscripts and coin collections which had been removed from the country in 1917 were returned to Petrograd in September 1921. Scientific contacts were established with foreign centers of Oriental studies. The government allocated currency for the purchase of books abroad and paper for the publication of Oriental research works. All of this, combined with the move to a new building in 1924, naturally promoted productive work by museum researchers, whose number tripled during these years.

In the 1920's museum researchers investigated the Chinese people's national liberation struggle (Academician V. M. Alekseyev) and sociopolitical and international events in the Arab world (Academician I. Yu. Krachkovskiy). Under S. F. Ol'denburg's supervision, museum researchers played a prominent role in the establishment of academic institutions in Petrograd and Moscow and schools of Eastern studies in Tashkent and Baku. The Oriental scholars were directly involved in the creation of written languages for ethnic groups lacking them. Turkish scholars played a part in converting the written language of the Turkic peoples from Arabic to Latin letters. Oriental scholars in Petrograd and Moscow took part in establishing the Eastern division of the General Staff Academy.

The "World Literature" Publishing House, with an Oriental literature department, was established during the civil war on the initiative of M. Gor'kiy. The catalogue of publications says: "The 'World Literature' Publishing House is now making the first attempt, with the aid of Russian Oriental scholars, to acquaint the Russian reader with the East's contributions to world literature by relating them to Western contributions. Russian Oriental scholars have responded eagerly to the appeals for simple Russian translations of the remarkable and typical works of Eastern writers."¹¹ This was another aspect of the work of Leningrad and Moscow Oriental scholars after the revolution.

M. Gor'kiy acknowledged and appreciated the achievements of scientists during the difficult years after the revolution. In a letter to S. F. Ol'denburg, he wrote: "I saw the stoic courage with which Russian men of science withstood the agonizing days of hunger and cold, I saw how they worked and how they died. My impressions of those days grew into a sense of deep and enthusiastic respect for you--the heroes of free and fearless investigation. I think that the Russian scientists taught the world a magnificent lesson in stoicism with their life and work during the years of intervention and blockade."¹² All of this applied not only to the man who received the letter, but also to many other Oriental scholars.

New objectives in higher education and science and forms of state supervision of scientific and higher academic institutions were defined precisely during the first years of the Soviet regime. A new structure and more effective organizational forms also had to be found for the team of Oriental scholars, particularly for the purpose of making use of the scientific potential of

such outstanding scholars as Marr, Bartol'd, Krachkovskiy, Orbeli, Vladimirtsov, Shcherbatskoy, Alekseyev and some others. The fragmented nature of this school of science, however, complicated the training of young researchers, the introduction of plans for the organization of the work of scientific teams and the concentration of forces in the most important fields.

But the process of integrating all of these scientists was obviously taking too long. Under these conditions, it was Sergey Fedorovich who insisted on the establishment of the Oriental Studies Institute of the Academy of Sciences in 1930, as a full-fledged and viable research center. The reorganization of the Asian Museum into an Oriental studies institute for the comprehensive study of sociopolitical and social issues in the Soviet and foreign East, as well as Eastern history, particularly current events, literature, language and economics, was far from a simple matter. Even an Oriental scholar as patriotic as Academician I. Yu. Krachkovskiy wrote the following about the Asian Museum in a nostalgic tone: "Of course, we were well aware that the academy would eventually have to make the transition from the sometimes primitive forms of individual work by small establishments to large comprehensive institutes with large research teams. Nevertheless, it made us sad when the work on manuscripts and collections, which was the nerve center and life's blood of the Asian Museum, was somehow shifted to the background and was no longer appreciated by everyone. The small group of scholars who lived in and for the library turned into a large research institute with dozens, and later hundreds, of researchers with sweeping plans. All of this was quite natural and understandable, but we recalled the old Asian Museum as people recall the beauty of handicrafts which disappear under the pressure of modern production."¹³

On the 50th anniversary of the start of Sergey Fedorovich Ol'denburg's career, Academician V. P. Volgin wrote: "It would be difficult to imagine anyone else performing the functions of the administrator of the Oriental Studies Institute under the extremely difficult conditions of reorganization with as much tact as was displayed in this work by Sergey Fedorovich."¹⁴

If the field of Oriental studies today is a diversified science renowned for the works of its historians, economists, linguists, sociologists, experts on culture and literature, political scientists and experts on manuscripts, a great deal of the credit must be given to the man, the scientist and scientific organizer, whose name is still pronounced with the greatest respect 50 years after his death.

Academician S. F. Ol'denburg left an indelible mark on the history of Soviet Oriental studies.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. A. Gordlevskiy, "Izbrannyye sochineniya" [Selected Works], vol 4, Moscow, 1968, p 470.
2. "Report of the Russian Academy of Sciences for 1918," p 1, quoted in "Aziatskiy muzey--Leningradskoye otdeleniye Instituta vostokovedeniya

AN SSSR" [The Asian Museum--The Leningrad Branch of the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences], Moscow, 1972, p 32.

3. S. F. Ol'denburg, "Vostok i Zapad v sovetskikh usloviyakh" [East and West Under Soviet Conditions], Moscow-Leningrad, 1931, p 13.
4. Ibid., p 12.
5. Ibid., p 13.
6. Ibid., p 10.
7. V. M. Alekseyev, "Nauka o Vostoke" [The Science of Oriental Studies], Moscow, 1982, p 22.
8. S. F. Ol'denburg, "Avtobiografiya" [Autobiography], Leningrad Branch of Academy of Sciences Archives, f 208, bk 2, c 15, sh 7.
9. V. M. Alekseyev, Op. cit., p 26.
10. Ibid., p 24.
11. "Catalogue of 'World Literature' Publications," St. Petersburg, 1919, p 5.
12. Quoted in: G. D. Komkov, B. V. Levshin and L. K. Semenov, "Akademiya nauk SSSR" [USSR Academy of Sciences], vol 2, Moscow, 1977, pp 17-18.
13. I. Yu. Krachkovskiy, "Izbrannyye sochineniya" [Selected Works], vol 1, Moscow-Leningrad, 1955, p 66.
14. "Sergeyu Fedorovichu Ol'denburg. Sbornik statey" [For Sergey Fedorovich Ol'denburg. Collected Articles], Leningrad, 1934, p 3.

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TRADE, FINANCE ACTIVITY OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 70-75

[Article by L. B. Borisov: "The Organization of the Islamic Conference: Economic, Social and Cultural Aspects of Its Activity"]

[Text] The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which was created in 1971 and unites 42 Muslim countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization, has always assigned priority to political matters.¹ The decision to form the organization, which was made at the first conference of the heads of state and government of Muslim countries in Rabat in September 1969, was motivated largely by political considerations, especially Israel's occupation of "holy places" on the West Bank of the Jordan as a result of its 1967 aggressive actions and the need to unite the efforts of the Islamic states in the struggle for their liberation.² Although the Mideast crisis has always been a matter of concern to the OIC, it has also become actively involved in other regional and international issues.

As a religious alliance, the OIC is made up of states with differing socio-economic, domestic and foreign policy aims. Its members include progressive countries, with the Arab states belonging to the National Resistance Front as their nucleus, and countries with conservative regimes, grouped around Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf emirates and some of the Tropical African countries connected to them by financial bonds. The OIC is influenced considerably by its right wing, which is inclined toward convergence with the Western countries but often has to oppose imperialist intrigues posing a threat to the vital interests of socialist-oriented states and to countries developing along capitalist lines.

All of this explains the organization's dual position on major international and regional issues. It favors effective guarantees of nuclear nonproliferation, advises Muslim states not to join military blocs or to allow the establishment of foreign military bases on their territory and supports proposals on the creation of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. The OIC is striving to free the Arab territories occupied by Israel, to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish an independent state, to aid in the political settlement of the Iraq-Iran conflict, to support national liberation movements in southern

Africa and so forth. Imperialists and their allies in the region, however, are striving to divert the OIC's attention from the cardinal issues of the day, to prevent its participation in the struggle to end the Mideast crisis and to urge, and with some success, the organization to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, Ethiopia and the PDRY, speak out in "defense" of Soviet Muslims and so forth.

The duality of the OIC's position on political matters also affects its approach to economic issues, to which it has paid increasing attention in recent years. The members of the organization do not view its undertakings in this sphere as a goal in themselves, but as a means of implementing the principle of "Islamic solidarity" and securing "deep, lasting and decisive changes" in the Muslim region, so that it will be able to counteract "any disruptions of the balance in today's world"³--in other words, they are supposed to aid in the resolution of political as well as economic problems.

The OIC's declared chief aim in the economic sphere was the organization of economic cooperation by Muslim countries on the basis of "the common faith, diversity, intersupplementary nature and colossal human and material potential of the Islamic world."⁴ This implied the creation of some kind of economic alliance of Muslim states. All of the attempts to implement the idea of this kind of economic alliance within the OIC framework, however, have been impeded by objective difficulties connected primarily with differences in the socio-economic structures of OIC countries and with the economic orientation of many of its members toward economic and commercial ties almost exclusively with developed capitalist countries. Nevertheless, the participation of oil-producing Arab states and Iran, with their substantial capital, in OIC activity provides real opportunities for the implementation of several specific economic cooperation projects.

The OIC has taken practical steps to expand economic ties among its members. In particular, an agreement has been signed on economic cooperation by the OIC states, a convention on the encouragement, protection and guarantee of capital investments in OIC countries has been drafted, a decision has been made on the creation of a permanent commission on economic and commercial cooperation to supervise the implementation of OIC decisions, and recommendations have been drawn up in connection with the plan for the development of economic cooperation.

In all, the Muslim states have planned 25 joint economic projects, and a fund of 3 billion dollars has been created for these projects. To date, only Saudi Arabia (1 billion dollars) and Kuwait (500 million dollars) have contributed to the fund.⁵ The majority of these projects are intended to develop secondary economic sectors and, as speakers noted at a session of the OIC commission on economic, social and cultural affairs (CESCA) in Tripoli in January 1982, economic cooperation within the organization framework has done little as yet to promote industrialization and the expanded production of material goods in Muslim countries. The OIC does, however, have some potential for the realization of joint economic projects, considering its sizeable available finances, which already exceed the resources available to, for example, as strong a regional organization as the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development

(400 million Kuwaiti dinars, or around 1.35 billion dollars),⁶ not to mention other regional organizations (the Arab Company for Industrial Investments--150 million Iranian dinars, or around 509 million dollars,⁷ the OPEC International Fund--440 million dollars, etc.).

Aid to the less developed OIC states is rendered primarily through the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), with 26 shareholders, 4 of which (Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait) control more than two-thirds of the IDB's charter capital, totaling 750 million Islamic dinars in 1977.⁸ By the end of 1977 the Islamic Bank had extended interest-free loans totaling 71 million dollars, its participation in development projects amounted to 53.6 million dollars and its loans to cover import costs totaled 50.5 million dollars.⁹

The main sphere of IDB activity is participation in development projects in the countries of Tropical Africa along with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Senegal River Development Organization, the Intergovernmental Committee To Combat the Drought in the Sahel and other African subregional organizations. The bank holds a leading place among regional financial establishments in terms of aid to African countries (422 million dollars) and number of ongoing projects (77 in 11 countries),¹⁰ surpassing the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (384 million dollars), the African Development Bank (318 million at the end of 1975)¹¹ and the Special Arab Fund for African Assistance (221.7 million at the end of 1977).¹² The IDB accounts for around 28 percent of the aid offered to the states of Tropical Africa between 1973 and 1980 through organizations established by Arab and other oil-producing countries. It is also significant, however, that much of the credit of the Islamic Bank is used for the development of the infrastructure,¹³ the establishment of which represents an important condition of economic independence, but only if it is combined with intensive industrialization--the most effective way of establishing a national economy and accelerating the growth of the social product.

The OIC does not render much assistance outside the bank framework. Although it announced its intention to participate in the Lagos Plan of Action to implement the Monrovia Strategy, adopted by a special session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1980,¹⁴ it has actually allocated only 3 million dollars for this purpose, and only 1.5 million has been distributed.¹⁵ The OIC attitude toward the Lagos Plan provides more evidence that it has done little as yet to promote the industrial development and economic independence of Africa.

The OIC has attempted to develop commercial relations between its members. For this purpose, an Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry was founded in December 1978 to strengthen cooperation by OIC members, coordinate the commercial and economic policies of the chambers of commerce of OIC countries and encourage trade, industry, agriculture and crafts. The creation of an Islamic center for the development of commercial relations within the near future is anticipated.¹⁶ In general, the OIC has been just as incapable of promoting reciprocal trade by its members, however, as other regional groups, such as the Arab "Common Market," ECOWAS, the Economic and Customs Union of Central Africa (UDEAC) and others. Broader commercial relations among OIC

countries are being impeded by the low level of economic development and the unisectorial economic structure. As a result of inadequate economic diversification, these countries have only two or three major exports, or even only one (in 1976 oil accounted for 99.7 percent of Oman's exports, 98.6 percent of Qatar's and 98.2 percent of Iran's, coffee accounted for 88.9 percent of Uganda's exports, etc.).¹⁷ The import needs of OIC states, consisting mainly of finished manufactured goods, reduced the scales of reciprocal trade even more. Finally, another of the main factors complicating the development of reciprocal trade is the influence of foreign private capital in the majority of OIC countries. In general, the OIC has been successful only in the joint financing of various economic projects through the IDB, and it has been unable to attain its chief goal in the economic sphere--the creation of an economic alliance of Muslim states.

In the international arena the OIC is promoting the efforts to establish a new international economic order (NIEO). In the opinion of OIC members, the need for the NIEO stems from "the constant degradation of the state of the world economy," and its establishment should lead to a "more just and unbiased" system of international economic relations.¹⁸ The OIC's demands in this connection do not transcend the bounds of the initiatives of the Group of 77 (which is typical for regional organizations) and include proposals regarding favorable conditions for producer-countries in raw material transactions, a comprehensive raw material program, easier access to modern technology for the developing countries, the elimination of trade barriers preventing the export of finished goods from developing states, the institution of measures to keep TNC's from inhibiting the development of national capital, etc.¹⁹

The OIC's considerable financial potential and the participation of the main oil-producing countries in its activity essentially allow the organization to make extensive use of economic weapons in the struggle to attain political goals. There has been a clear tendency toward this in OIC activity. Conflicts between the progressive and conservative wings, however, and the continuing economic dependence of OIC members on imperialist powers often keep the OIC from taking the proper actions and usually cause it to confine itself to general recommendations.

This has been most apparent in the OIC's approach to the use of the economic factor in the struggle to eradicate the consequences of Israeli aggression. The organization passed a resolution on the use of the financial and oil potential of Muslim states to stop Israeli aggression, on material support for the Palestinian Arabs and on a military and economic boycott of countries cooperating with Tel Aviv. At the third conference of the heads of state and government of Islamic countries in Mecca-At Ta'if (January 1981), a decision was made to create a Jerusalem Fund for the financial support of the Arab struggle to liberate occupied territories. Representatives of progressive Arab states have pointed out, however, that economic means of struggle would certainly have the greatest impact if they could be used against the imperialist powers supporting Israel, especially the United States, in view of the economic importance of the Muslim states to these powers as sources of oil and other crude resources, large sales markets and depositors of petrodollars in Western banks. The progressive Arab countries have repeatedly stated the need

to counteract all of the "military, economic and political endeavors of the United States, as the main opponent of the desires of the Arab race and the main ally of the Zionist enemy."²⁰ All specific proposals with regard to this, however, have been blocked by Saudi Arabia and other conservative Muslim states, which do not want to use the oil weapon and economic sanctions against the United States and Israel's other supporters on the grounds that the organization should "correct, and not punish."

The use of economic sanctions by OIC members against states cooperating with the South African racists in violation of UN decisions and thereby aiding in the preservation of the apartheid regime, could be of equal value. The OIC has asked the Muslim states to support liberation movements in southern Africa but has avoided all mention of the use of economic pressure in the struggle against the system of racial discrimination.

The conservative Muslim countries have prevented the use of OIC financial and economic potential in support of national liberation movements and have allocated large sums to aid various organizations fighting against progressive regimes in the region. Even in the 1960's, for example, during the civil war in Yemen, Arab reactionary forces gave material support to rightwing forces employing religious slogans to oppose revolutionary changes in the Arab world.²¹ In the 1970's and 1980's the conservative Islamic countries offered substantial financial assistance to counterrevolutionary Muslim organizations operating in Afghanistan. Muslim reactionary forces were unable to give these organizations additional support through OIC channels, however, when the OIC left wing objected to the use of the organization as an instrument of intervention in the affairs of the DRA and other states in the region.

In the ideological sphere, the main OIC goal is the spread of Islam. The most active promoters of this are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Libya. These countries approach the matter from different vantage points, however: Whereas the conservative Arab regimes are trying to restore the shaky foundations of traditional Islam in the developing countries, the Libyans advocate a "truly revolutionary Muslim religion" which will give people an opportunity to "fight more effectively for their freedom."²²

The OIC is taking action in three main areas to strengthen the Muslim religion: the integration of Islam in the system of education, in science and in culture; the support of Muslim communities in non-Islamic countries; missionary work. The OIC has created a diversified system of establishments to carry out this work, such as the Standing Committee on Cooperation in Information and Culture, the Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Affairs, the Islamic Education, Science and Culture Organization, the Islamic Research Center on the History of Art and Muslim Culture, the International Islamic Information Agency, the Radio Broadcasting Organization of Islamic States and others. The Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF) has been set up to finance measures to publicize the Muslim religion. According to a decision of the third "summit" conference, its capital should total 100 million dollars. Besides this, Muslim minorities in India, Thailand, the Philippines and some other countries are receiving financial aid through IDB committee collections, representing 3 percent of the total credit extended to them.²³ The Muslim religion is being publicized by

the Islamic Organization for Interaction with the World Islamic Congress, engaged in the Islamic training of youth, and the Islamic League, engaged in the dissemination of pan-Islamic ideals.

Higher and secondary academic institutions have been founded and are operating under OIC auspices, including the Islamic Institute of Technical Sciences, the Islamic Center for Vocational-Technical Training in Dacca and others. Islamic centers, mosques and libraries have been built or are being built in several countries. The declaration of the third "summit" conference said that the beginning of the 15th century of Hegira should become "the start of a universal Islamic revival...and the merger of their (Muslims'--L. B.) civilizations in the world." The organization has drafted a plan for propaganda undertakings and has begun to carry it out.²⁴

The construction of some religious facilities--including some extremely important ones--has been delayed by a shortage of funds and by administrative red tape. In particular, no action has been taken to date on the decision to build Islamic universities in Nigeria and Uganda, a decision made at the second summit conference in Lahore (February 1974) and approved at the third conference in Mecca-At Ta'if.²⁵

In spite of the difficulties the OIC has encountered in the implementation of its economic, social and cultural plans, its members intend to promote increased activity by the organization in these spheres. In its attempts to implement the principles of Islamic solidarity, however, the OIC has had to deal with the social, political and ideological heterogeneity of the Muslim countries. As speakers noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, there are two main currents in the Islamic world today, one of which is leading the liberation struggle under Islamic banners while the other is employing Muslim slogans for counterrevolutionary purposes.²⁶ This heterogeneity is complicating the attainment of OIC goals and is simultaneously making OIC moves in this sphere ambiguous. The activities of the OIC reflect the desire of developing countries, including Muslim states, to freely manage their own natural resources and achieve economic independence and total equality in the system of international economic relations. There is also the danger, however, that imperialist powers might use this alliance, with the aid of some of the oil-producing states bound to them, to consolidate their own economic influence in the region, accelerate the process by which Islamic countries are becoming involved in the world system of capitalist economic relations and increase their economic dependence on the West.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. B. Borisov, "The Organization of the Islamic Conference: Political Aspects of Its Activity," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1983, No 4, p 101.
2. "The Middle East and North Africa. 1978-79," London, 1979, p 159.
3. LE SOLEIL, 20 January 1983.
4. Statement by Nigerien Foreign Minister D. Diallo at the 13th Conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic States (LE SAHEL, 24 August 1982).

5. LE SAHEL, 24 August 1982.
6. "The Middle East and North Africa. 1978-79," p 137.
7. Ibid., p 149.
8. Ibid., p 155. The "Islamic dinar" is equivalent to "special drawing rights" (1 dollar = 1.06 SDR), see AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, 5 October 1983, p 1.
9. "The Middle East and North Africa. 1978-79," p 155.
10. JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 June 1982, p 75.
11. "Mezhdunarodnyye ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya razvivayushchikhsya stran. Ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo mezhdurazvivayushchimisya gosudarstvami" [International Economic Relations of Development Countries. Economic Cooperation by Developing States], Moscow, 1982, p 180.
12. "The Middle East and North Africa. 1978-79," p 136.
13. "Islam. Kratkiy spravochnik" [Brief Handbook on Islam], Moscow, 1983, p 130.
14. UN Doc A/J-11/14, 21 August 1980.
15. JEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 August-1 September 1982, p 27.
16. LE SAHEL, 23 August 1982.
17. "Mezhdunarodnyye ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya razvivayushchikhsya stran," p 123.
18. Statement by D. Diallo at the 13th Conference of Foreign Ministers of Islamic States (LE SAHEL, 24 August 1982).
19. IRAQ TODAY, 1-15 September 1979, p 12. Statement by Libyan Foreign Secretary A. Turayki in General Assembly on 12 October 1977 (UN Doc A/32/PV 31, p 57).
20. "Communique of the Special Conference of the Libyan and Palestinian Revolutionary Leadership in Tripoli (13-15 June 1979)," AL-FAJR AL-JADID, 16 June 1979.
21. "Rabochiy klass i antiimperialisticheskaya revolyutsiya v Azii, Afrike i Latinskoy Amerike" [The Working Class and the Anti-Imperialist Revolution in Asia, Africa and Latin America], Moscow, 1969, pp 107-113.
22. AL-FAJR AL-JADID, 20 October 1976.
23. "Mezhdunarodnyye ekonomicheskiye otnosheniya razvivayushchikhsya stran," p 199.

24. LE SAHEL, 24 August 1982.

25. Ibid.

26. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress],
Moscow, 1981, p 13.

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Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1984

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CSO: 1807/137

CONFERENCE ON WORK OF JOURNAL PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 111-121

[Report on sessions of academic councils of Africa Institute and Oriental Studies Institute on 12 and 21 March in Moscow]

[Excerpts] The academic councils of the Africa Institute and Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, met on 12 and 21 March this year to discuss the work of the editorial board and editors of NARODY AZII I AFRIKI. A jointly prepared report on the main areas of the journal's activity was presented by Editor-in-Chief A. A. Kutsenkov to the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, and by Assistant Editor-in-Chief Ya. A. Glushchenko to the Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences (the text of the report is printed below). This was followed by a discussion period.

NARODY AZII I AFRIKI has been published for almost 30 years. During this time its scientific and sociopolitical aims have been clearly defined and it has acquired the kind of traditions that are essential to the survival of any serious press organ. The main traditions are adherence to party principles, pertinent subject matter and a highly exacting approach to the analytical and politico-ideological content of articles submitted for publication. The maintenance and reinforcement of these traditions have been aided by the stability of the editorial team and by the consistency and representative nature of the editorial board.

The success of a magazine, however, does not depend on traditions alone. Life and science march on. For this reason, journal policy and subject matter are constantly updated. Reliable points of reference for this kind of adjustment are found primarily in the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress, defining the main objectives of the Soviet social sciences, the decisions of the June (1983), February and April (1984) CPSU Central Committee plenums and the CPSU Central Committee decree on the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. These documents have been discussed by the editors, and plans for journal subject matter have been adjusted accordingly. The documents and papers of principal significance in our work also include the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium decree of 30 June 1983 "On the Responsibility of the USSR Academy of Sciences To Implement the Decisions of the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum," the article by Academic Secretary S. L. Tikhvinskiy of the History Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences on "The Responsibility of Historians

To Implement the Decisions of the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum" (VOPROSY ISTORII, 1984, No 1) and the report presented by Academician Ye. M. Primakov at the Second Congress of the All-Union Association of Orientalologists (Baku, May 1983), published in issue No 5 for 1983 under the title "Current Objectives in Soviet Oriental Studies." Analyses of the project plans of the Oriental Studies Institute and Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, conferences, symposiums and communication with authors and readers aid in the adjustment of journal policy.

Each issue of NARODY AZII I AFRIKI consists of 23.2 publisher's signature sheets. In other words, the relatively small editorial team publishes 139-140 author's sheets of printed material each year. Each issue generally contains 30-35 articles, giving 180-210 authors an opportunity to express their views in the magazine each year. The journal is distributed only by subscription. It has 3,500-3,600 subscribers, one-third of them abroad. From one to three articles on general Afro-Asian subjects can usually be found in each issue, as well as articles and reports on the economy, politics, history and culture of specific countries, information about the activities of Soviet and foreign scientific centers, surveys, reviews, book reports, etc.

The journal has both permanent and occasional sections. The permanent ones are "Articles," "Reports," "Scientific Events" and "Criticism and Bibliography." The occasional sections are "Problems in Methodology," "Publications," "Portraits," "From the History of Oriental and African Studies," "The Teaching of Subjects in Oriental Studies" and others. Special sections cover major events in history. In 1982, for example, there was a permanent section on "The 60th Anniversary of the USSR." In 1984 and 1985 articles will be published under the special rubric "Approaching the 40th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." In 1982 and 1983, 45 articles were published in the sections "Exchange of Opinions," "Roundtable" and "Discussions." These discussion sections are not a bow to fashion, but an effective way of developing creative debate. Each of these sections has its own specific features, but all of them are intended to aid in performing the journal's main functions. The definition of these functions must be preceded by answers to the following questions: What are the journal's aims? What place does it occupy among other academic publications of this type? For what kind of author and reader is it intended? And finally, what are the principal guidelines of its activity?

As the organ of two head institutes, the Oriental Studies Institute and Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the journal sees its aims as the following:

To publicize the achievements of Soviet Oriental and African studies;

To stimulate the investigation of pertinent aspects of the economic, social and cultural development of Afro-Asian countries;

To present logical arguments refuting bourgeois views in the fields of Oriental and African studies and to expose anticommunism, neocolonialism and militarism;

To promote, with its publications, stronger friendship and cooperation between our country and the Afro-Asian peoples in the interests of the struggle against imperialism and for peace and progress;

To contribute to the communist indoctrination of the younger generation of Oriental and African scholars.

In other words, the journal is not only a mirror reflecting the present state of our science, but also an active participant in the scientific process.

The journal's place in the system of academic periodicals is defined primarily by its interdisciplinary nature. It examines the past and present of Afro-Asian societies and aspects of their economic and social relations, politics and culture.

NARODY AZII I AFRIKI is an academic journal. This presupposes a primary concern with scientific subjects and highly professional and analytical articles. Our view of pertinence is also colored by the academic nature of the magazine. This applies primarily to the pertinence of scientific matters. This approach removes all questions about the correspondence of articles dealing with contemporary and traditional cycles, which has been discussed at length at scientific conference and in the scientific press.

We should provide some information about the journal's authors and readers. The authors for whom the journal is intended are researchers, qualified specialists in their field, capable of adding something new to Oriental and African studies. It is understandable that most of our authors come from research institutes--primarily the Oriental Studies Institute, the Leningrad Branch of the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The journal also reflects the scientific achievements of other centers of Oriental and African studies in our country. An exacting approach to the quality of articles does not mean that the magazine publishes only "venerable" authors. We also welcome articles from beginners in this field and spare no effort in working with them if the articles they submit for publication, however unpolished they may be, contain elements of ingenuity and originality. The journal is intended for readers with some background in this field. These are researchers, VUZ instructors, students and graduate students and people with a deep and constant interest in a variety of Asian and African issues.

Now a few words about the principal guidelines of journal activity. The journal's nature as a scientific academic publication assigns priority to its scientific and scientific-organizational function--the elucidation and stimulation of investigations of pertinent aspects of Oriental and African studies in the USSR. The editorial board and editorial team concentrate on two types of investigations--methodological inquiries and studies of specific topics.

In the sphere of methodology, the main objective is the continued clarification of the approach of dialectical materialism, with its general view of the world, in relation to Oriental and African studies, and the determination of means, procedures and methods of studying Afro-Asian societies. Oriental and

African scholars must deal more constantly than any other social scientists with comprehensive topics. This stems from the very nature of the Afro-Asian societies, the inadequate separation between elements of the basis and superstructure and spheres of societal life, the incomplete differentiation of classes, etc. The analysis of these topics from the standpoint of a single field of science, whether it is political economy, history, philosophy or another, obviously presupposes fundamentally incomplete knowledge. This can be surmounted by uniting the efforts of specialists in various fields and synthesizing the results of their research. Only this can produce the total picture of the object of research and a total understanding of the internal logic of its development and its dynamic model, which will aid in explaining tendencies in its evolution. The essential nature of this approach is particularly evident when the object of research is a complex structure, such as a family, clan, ethnic group, caste, religious community, etc. This also applies to some extent to so-called modern structures--classes, trade unions and parties--whose composition and activity display closely interwoven traditional and modern elements.

The most promising field of investigation in the methodology of Oriental and African studies is the Marxist systemic approach. It teaches the researcher to examine the object of research in its entirety, discern all of its elements, internal connections and the machinery of their interaction and development and summarize all of them in a single analytical model.

Unfortunately, this section of the magazine is not distinguished by an abundance and variety of articles. In 1982 this rubric was used for V. A. Shnirel'man's article "Innovation and Cultural Continuity" (No 5), in 1983 it was used for N. A. Simoniya's article "Aspects of the Structural Transition in Antagonistic Eastern Societies in the Modern Era" (No 2), and in 1984 it was used for Yu. I. Semenov's article "Basic Phases in the Evolution of the Primitive Economy" (No 1). It is true that methodological problems are discussed in articles in other sections of the journal. These include the above-mentioned article by Academician Ye. M. Primakov, G. K. Shirokov's article "Colonies and Dependent Countries" (1983, No 3) and S. D. Serebryanny's survey of "Some Problems in the Study of R. Tagore's Works" (1983, No 4). These matters were also mentioned in the roundtable discussions on "The Mass Mentality in the Developing World" (1982, No 2) and "An Inquiry into the Categories of Traditional Chinese Culture" (1983, No 3). But this is not enough.

In our opinion, there are two reasons for this. The first is the Oriental scholar's lack of interest in methodological matters, and the second is our own failure to solicit enough of these articles. Here is a specific example. The analysis of international conflicts is a relatively new and promising field of Oriental and African studies. The Oriental Studies Institute and Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences have conducted quite productive investigations of the methodology of this kind of analysis. They could share their findings with the reading public. In spite of considerable effort, however, the journal was unable to obtain a single article on this important topic from the institutes.

As far as specific scientific subjects are concerned, it is the policy of the journal to discern and stimulate new fields of research and (or) new approaches to traditional topics in a timely manner.

The present international situation and the interests of our state today have made it essential that Soviet Oriental and African scholars study problems of war and peace, the role of militarism in imperialism's neocolonial policy, the effect of the arms race on socioeconomic processes in the developing countries and the role of these countries in international relations and in the struggle for peace and disarmament. Several articles in the journal have dealt with this group of topics, particularly P. Ya. Koshelev's "Soviet Economic Cooperation with Developing Countries" (1982, No 2), V. F. Davydov's "Nuclear Weapons and the Developing World" (1983, No 2), N. A. Gnevushev's "The Soviet Union and the Struggle Against the Arms Race in Asia" (1983, No 4), V. S. Kotlyarov's "The Nonaligned Movement: Some Results and Prospects" (1983, No 5) and others.

The antiwar theme will continue to occupy a prominent place on the pages of the journal. Some of the most pertinent topics today are the revival of Japanese militarism and the threat it poses to developing states in the Pacific, the pernicious effects of military-political dependence (as exemplified by such countries and territories as Israel, South Korea, Taiwan and others), the causes and consequences of regional conflicts and local wars in the Afro-Asian region and the contribution of newly liberated countries to the consolidation of peace. These topics deal with qualitatively new phenomena--militarism as a means of attaining neocolonial goals, the enrichment of the national liberation movements with antiwar content and the expansion of cooperation by young independent states with the USSR and the world socialist system in the struggle against imperialism and for peace and progress.

The editorial board and editors of the journal are invariably concerned with difficulties in the political and socioeconomic development of new independent states. Articles and reports dealing with this subject matter probably constitute the majority of journal publications. The most significant include A. Ya. El'yanov's "Developing Countries: Foreign Economic Ties and the Reproduction Process" (1982, No 1), G. N. Klimko and A. I. Rogach's "The Mixed Companies of International Corporations in Developing Countries" (1982, No 2), V. V. Vladimirov's "The 'Open Door' Policy in Egypt and the Local Bourgeoisie" (1982, No 2), Ye. N. Mel'nikov's "The Formation of the Machinery of State in Socialist-Oriented African Countries" (1982, No 3), M. M. Avsenev and S. M. Ancharov's "Problems in the Formation of National Accumulations in the Countries of Tropical Africa" (1982, No 4), N. Ya. Shustrova's "The Scientific and Technical Potential of Developing Countries" (1983, No 1), D. G. Karakhanyan's "Agrarian Policy in Libyan Jamahiriya" (1983, No 2) and S. A. Bessonov's "State Planning in Africa" (1983, No 5).

The journal always contains discussions of the structural transition and structural affiliations of Afro-Asian societies and analyses of the prerequisites and natural progression of non-capitalist development, in view of their great scientific importance. The journal has published a discussion of "Stages in the Structural Formation of Modern Eastern Societies" (1982, No 1) and an article by V. L. Sheynis and A. Ya. El'yanov on "Problems in the Transformation of the Socioeconomic Structures of Developing Countries" (1983, No 4). Debates are regularly published under the heading "Class Formation and the Choice of Development Patterns." In 1982 and 1983, 11 articles were published

in this section. They included articles by A. V. Malyarov, G. I. Starchenkov, L. A. Fridman and S. V. Voronin, V. Ya. Belokrenitskiy, O. Z. Mushtuk and others.

The national liberation movement, the struggle for a new international economic order, the non-capitalist orientation and the transition to socialism have been investigated in a number of works, such as the following articles: A. P. Butenko's "Some Analytical Aspects of the Transition to Socialism in Countries with an Underdeveloped Economy" (1982, No 5), B. N. Dobrovskiy's "Newly Liberated Countries and the Reorganization of the International System of Currency and Financial Relations" (1983, No 2) and I. V. Cherkasova's "The African States in the Struggle Against South African Economic Expansion" (1983, No 4).

We must admit with regret, however, that there has been a tendency to "skirt the issue," adding nothing new to previous discussions, in journal articles on some subjects, including such vital issues as the struggle for a new international economic order, the non-capitalist pattern of development, the revolutionary democratic movement and others.

The journal underscored the importance of traditional factors, including religion, in the life of Afro-Asian societies long before the "Islamic explosion." Some of the problems of various communities, castes and religions have been elucidated on its pages. This played a positive role in directing the attention of Oriental and African scholars to extremely complex but little-researched topics.

In 1982 and 1983 the journal published the following articles and reports: D. V. Mosyakov's "Khmer Petty Bourgeois Utopias and the Practices of the Pol Pot Regime" (1982, No 1), Ye. A. Torchinov's "The Interaction of Taoism and Chinese Culture" (1982, No 2), S. V. Volkov's "The State and the Buddhist Administration in Korea (6th-9th Centuries)" (1982, No 3), I. A. Latyshev's "Old and New Elements in Japanese Family Upbringing" (1982, No 4), O. Ye. Nepomnin's "The Synthesis of Traditionalist Reaction and Anti-Imperialism: The Yihetuan Movement in China" (1982, No 6), D. Ye. Yeremeyev's "The Reflection of Patriarchal and Tribal Traditions in the Shari'at" (1983, No 1), A. N. Meshcheryakov's "Buddhism and Ethics in Early Medieval Japan" (1983, No 1), B. I. Klyuyev's "Secularization in India" (1983, No 2), Yu. A. Petrosyan's "The Muslim Clergy and Reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century" (1983, No 2), A. B. Zubov's "The Political Culture of Lebanon: The Past and Present of a Religious Democracy" (1983, No 2), M. T. Stepanyants' "The Muslim Revival" (1983, No 3), Ye. Yu. Ionova's "Indonesia: An Inquiry into the History of Local Nationalism in Ache" (1983, No 3) and L. B. Borisova's "Political Aspects of the Activities of the Islamic Conference" (1983, No 4).

In the next few years we hope to pay closer attention to the categorization of traditional communities. Categorization is not simply a matter of "taking inventory" of traditional communities, but also a method of their comprehension. We would like to acquaint our readers with the analytical models of the most typical communities--the patriarchal family, clan, tribe, ethnic group

and religious community--and describe their evolution, their participation in contemporary class-formation processes and their role in contemporary politics, in the involvement of the masses in the political process and in the creation of modern social and political structures.

In the past, these structures and institutions have always been researched by ethnographers. Oriental and African scholars--historians, economists and political analysts--have not investigated these matters to any considerable extent. The ethnographic approach cannot satisfy our interest in these institutions, however, especially in view of the fact that the journal is mainly concerned with social and political issues.

In our opinion, important topics pertaining to the colonial and pre-colonial past of Afro-Asian societies include the ways in which these societies were affected by European conquests. As for the exploitative and destructive functions of colonialism, these aspects have been a matter of primary interest to Soviet scholars for decades. For a long time, however, the interaction of civilizations and cultures, the evolution of traditional structures and institutions and their adaptation to the conditions of developing capitalism were ignored by researchers. As a result, scientific conclusions about the transforming role of capitalism, the disintegration of the traditional society and the maturity of contemporary classes and forms of social life were too far ahead of the historical process, led to the unjustifiable "updating" of Afro-Asian societies and did not give us an adequate background for a correct interpretation of the outbursts of traditionalism in our day: Knowledge of the past is essential to an understanding of the present.

There is no need to say that colonial dependence alone cannot explain all of the differences in the present development of Afro-Asian peoples. The developmental paths of the West and these peoples diverged to some degree even in the pre-colonial era. The East, for example, was already displaying underdevelopment then, perhaps not so much in the sphere of production or labor productivity as in the mobility and dynamism of its social institutions and in the evolution of personal relations. For this reason, we feel that the answer to questions about the reasons for the underdevelopment of this region should also be sought in the peculiarities of the pre-colonial Eastern social order, property relations, social structures, culture, ideology, etc. This is still a matter of the "Asian method of production," but in a specifically historical sense rather than an abstract philosophical one. It would seem that the reconstruction of pre-colonial social institutions with the aid of archaeological and paleobotanical data, cultural monuments and so forth could, on the basis of Marxist methodology, provide answers to several fundamental questions about the social order of Asian and African countries in the pre-colonial era and serve as a point of departure for the analysis of their subsequent evolution.

What has already been accomplished in this field? The journal has published several articles we found interesting on the development patterns of Asian and African peoples in antiquity and subsequent historical eras. They include V. M. Rybakov's "The Legal Status of Dignitaries in Medieval China" (1982, No 3), K. Z. Ashrafyan's "The Indian Medieval City" (1982, No 4),

S. N. Goncharov's "The Inter-Group Struggle of Dignitaries in China (12th Century)" (1982, No 4), S. V. Kullanda's "Some Aspects of the Social Order of Early Javanese States" (1982, No 5), N. B. Kochakova's "The Evolution of Traditional Political Structures in Nigeria in the Colonial Period" (1982, No 2), A. N. Meshcheryakov's "Buddhism and Ethics in Early Medieval Japan" (1983, No 1), Yu. A. Petrosyan's "The Muslim Clergy and Reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century" (1983, No 2), A. A. Bokshanin's "Independent Rulers in China (Late 14th Century)" (1983, No 2), A. S. Agadzhanyan's "Provincial Dignitaries and State Feudalism in Burma" (1983, No 3), A. B. Letnev's "The Development of the Social Aims of West African 'Evoluers'" (1983, No 4), T. P. Grigor'yeva's "Sages and Rulers" (1983, No 5), S. V. Kullanda's "The Physical Culture and Economy of Prehistoric West Indonesia" (1983, No 5) and A. S. Mugruzin's "Forms of Peasant Exploitation in Medieval China" (1983, No 5). The investigation of the material and spiritual history of Asia and Africa was promoted by the publication of an exchange of views on this subject, "An Inquiry into the Categories of Traditional Chinese Culture" (1983, No 5).

In our era, as CPSU documents stress, the ideological struggle has been intensified dramatically, and Soviet science is participating actively in this struggle. The journal's functions in this field, it seems to us, consist primarily in confirming the superiority of the Marxist historical-dialectical method in researching complex problems in the past and present of the Asian and African peoples by means of the achievements of Soviet Oriental and African scholars. In this context, each skillfully written and meaningful article is a definite response to our party's appeal. Of course, our efforts in the struggle against bourgeois ideology and against anticommunism, militarism, neocolonialism, racism and Zionism, which are frequently camouflaged in scientific studies, are not confined only to this.

The journal responds actively to dates marking major events in the history of the Soviet people. The series of articles and papers published in issues 4, 5 and 6 in 1982 in connection with the 60th anniversary of the USSR is a good example. The series consisted of R. A. Ul'yanovskiy's article "The Soviet Socialist Federation and the Developing Countries," An. A. Gromyko's article "Experience in the Resolution of Ethnic Problems in the USSR and the Afro-Asian World," A. I. Ol'shannyi's article "The Significance of Experience in Socialist Planning for the Developing States" and others. Other articles with an ideological propaganda value in addition to scientific significance are A. V. Kiva and V. M. Shastitko's "The Historical Experience of Bolshevism and Revolutionary Democrats in the Afro-Asian Countries" (1983, No 3), E. N. Komarov's "The 1905-1907 Revolution in Russia and the National Liberation Movement in India" (1983, No 4), V. Ya. Shveytser's "The Socialist Internationale and the Mideast Conflict" (1983, No 3) and others.

Articles printed in the section entitled "From the History of Oriental and African Studies" confirm the priority of Soviet science in the development of various fields of Oriental and African studies, give our remarkable scholars in these fields credit for their achievements, resurrect the memories of those whose names have been unjustifiably forgotten and give new life to their ideas which are still pertinent even today. The best of these articles awake a sense of pride in Soviet science, aid in patriotic indoctrination and

corroborate the high principles of scientific service. Nine articles were printed in this section of the journal in 1982 and 1983. They included B. A. Litvinskiy's "Soviet and Foreign Studies of the Ancient History and Culture of East Turkestan" (1982, No 1), A. B. Khalidov's "Academician Ignat'y Yulianovich Krachkovskiy" (1983, No 4), V. M. Borisov's "A. V. Boldyrev--The First Russian Orientologist" (1983, No 5) and others. It is unlikely that any reader remained unaffected by M. V. Ban'kovskaya's essay "V. M. Alekseyev--Critic and Target of Criticism" (1983, No 5) and by the reviews of Academician V. M. Alekseyev's book "Nauka o Vostoke" [The Science of Oriental Studies] by S. L. Tikhvinskiy, A. S. Martynov and I. S. Smirnov in issue No 1 for 1984. The essay and reviews portrayed V. M. Alekseyev, the scientist and patriot. He combined the qualities of a genuine scholar--diligence to the point of self-torture, encyclopaedic knowledge, insight, intellectual profundity, respect for colleagues and concern for talented youths--with an unselfish and wholehearted adherence to principle and absolute intolerance for superficiality, narrowmindedness, spinelessness and opportunism. We feel that the glorious images of scholars like Alekseyev should become a model and a guide for younger generations of Oriental and African scholars. The editorial team hopes to continue the work in this field.

Can we be satisfied with our past accomplishments? Probably not. First of all, the subject matter of journal articles is sometimes fragmented. We feel that the study of Afro-Asian issues should be conducted on a broad front, that reports on specific events should be combined with regular summaries of the overall situation. The journal does not print enough thorough and sweeping conceptual articles on current aspects of Oriental and African studies, which could sum up past achievements and set future research goals.

Above all, the ideological level of articles must be raised and their subject matter must be expanded, primarily through the mastery of new and promising fields. For this purpose, it would be extremely desirable for the Oriental Studies Institute and Africa Institute to fill their pages of the journal with the most interesting and informative reports on projects, research findings, etc.

What kind of potential do we have for the further improvement of the journal's work?

We could establish closer contact with centers of Oriental studies in our country, especially the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute. In this context, it would be useful to invite members of the journal staff to participate in institute research and publishing projects. One possibility in this field would be the publication of Russian- and foreign-language anthologies of journal articles (the Africa Institute is already doing this).

We could also establish closer contact with authors and readers. Our work with potential authors in the Africa Institute attests to the indisputable value of such undertakings. And of course, we must meet more frequently with our readers. Feedback will invigorate the editorial board and editorial team.

At the session of the academic council of the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, Department Chief P. M. Shastitko said that articles on aspects of the traditional cycle are skillfully combined in the magazine with contemporary studies, particularly in the sections "Exchange of Opinions," "Roundtable," "Portraits" and "Criticism and Bibliography." The journal does not publish enough methodological articles, however, which could serve as the basis for debates. The editors should seek out authors more actively, particularly scholars working in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and other centers of Oriental and African studies.

Yu. A. Petrosyan (head of the Leningrad Branch of the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) stressed that branch researchers maintain constant and productive contact with the journal. The number of articles by Leningrad Oriental scholars in NARODY AZII I AFRIKI is constantly rising. The number of journal sections dealing with specific topics should be increased. It would be a good idea to publish long articles in serialized form (in up to three issues).

According to L. I. Reysner (sector chief), the journal skillfully combines general political, academic and cultural studies. Its interest in young authors is commendable. Articles in the section "Criticism and Bibliography" raise vital issues and make note of new developments in Soviet Oriental and African studies. The publication of surveys by Soviet authors on broad subjects, such as agriculture, the role of the state and others, would be useful.

NARODY AZII I AFRIKI is the only press organ reflecting the academic level of Soviet Oriental studies, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences G. F. Kim, deputy director of the institute, said. Huge quantities of documented information are now available to scientists and are augmenting our knowledge of fundamental problems in the development of Eastern countries, but there is a serious shortage of studies of general methodological problems. It is extremely important to sum up the results of scientific research projects and debates. The results of productive and extensive scientific discussions are often not summarized, and this diminishes the value of all of the work involved. The Soviet science of Oriental studies is developing in constant interaction with foreign scientific centers, especially in the countries of the socialist community. The publication of articles by leading Oriental scholars in the socialist countries would be useful.

According to Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ye. P. Chelyshev (department chief), the publication of articles about new theories of interest in works in progress and about older works reflecting the most outstanding achievements in Oriental Studies in the "Criticism and Bibliography" section would be useful. In the opinion of Yu. V. Gankovskiy (department chief), the journal is doing much to publicize the achievements of Soviet Oriental scholars and corroborate their priority. It is well known abroad. Obviously, the time has come to arrange for its publication in foreign languages, starting with English. The present English summaries are not enough. Yu. V. Gankovskiy's suggestion was approved by many other researchers who took part in the discussion.

K. Z. Ashrafyan (research team supervisor) mentioned the need for closer contact between NARODY AZII I AFRIKI and other academic journals, the exchange of articles between them and so forth. The journal should contain more extensive coverage of scientific conferences and symposiums abroad and the work of foreign centers of Oriental studies. N. A. Simoniya (department chief) believes that institute researchers could benefit most from the preparation of methodological articles for the magazine, and for this reason his sector and departments should find ways of helping the journal.

The results of the discussion were summarized by Academician Ye. M. Primakov, institute director. He stressed that the journal should contain accurate descriptions of objective changes in the Eastern countries and new developments in Soviet Oriental studies and the activities of the head academic establishments. Although there has been perceptible progress in the journal's work in recent years, certain shortcomings must still be surmounted. One of these is the low level of analytical discussions in the "Exchange of Opinions" section. Some articles are of little value. Roundtable discussions are rarely printed, and the most important and vital issues are not even discussed in this section. The statements about the need to sum up the results of scientific debates were correct, and it is obvious that the collective ideas of leading scientists should serve as the basis for this. The scientific affairs of the Oriental Studies Institute should be covered more regularly and extensively, and readers should be informed regularly about the activities of the All-Union Association of Oriental Scholars.

It is correct that the articles in the "Criticism and Bibliography" section are satisfactory, but there are also huge quantities of foreign literature on Oriental studies which have not been reflected adequately in the journal.

At the session of the academic council of the Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, institute Deputy Director L. V. Goncharov said that several valuable and thorough articles on important aspects of African studies had been published in the journal. There has also been, however, an obvious shortage of discerning analyses of ideological theories about African development patterns. These theories are propounded by African social scientists as well as by Western bourgeois scientists. Obviously, more attention should be given to general discussions of the experience in government, party and cultural construction in socialist-oriented countries. Too few articles on such important topics as the place and role of the African culture in world development and the role of Islam in the African countries have been published. Discussions of such major topics as general and particular features of the economic and sociopolitical development of independent African states, the spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism in the African countries, changes in the social structure of African countries and the role of various classes and groups in the anti-imperialist struggle and in social development should occupy a prominent place in the journal.

N. D. Kosukhin (department chief) believes that the journal should contain more thorough discussions of new developments in the African countries. The food crisis in Africa is exceptionally important today, but it has almost been ignored in the journal. Institute researchers are still participating

too little in the journal's work. Although the number of their articles is rising, there is an urgent need for the improvement of their quality. L. I. Aleksandrovskaya (department chief) said that the journal should give more extensive coverage to African economic affairs. Many theories about the economic development of African countries are now being put forth in the West, and documents are being drawn up, particularly the new idea of a "common market" with associate members, etc. These, however, are often overlooked by the journal.

In his concluding speech, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences An. A. Gromyko, institute director, stressed that the journal has done much to elucidate African affairs and to publicize the policy of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community on this continent. It still has many difficult tasks to perform, however, and these will necessitate the closest ties and contacts between the journal and the scientific subdivisions of the institute. More attention should be given to the organization of these contacts. The journal staff obviously needs to do more to ensure that published articles are interesting as well as informative. It is particularly significant that not all of the leading researchers of the Africa Institute are taking an active part in the journal's work, and it is suffering from a shortage of articles by qualified authors. An. A. Gromyko expressed the hope that the journal would attain all of its objectives successfully with the aid of institute researchers.

The academic councils of the Oriental Studies Institute and Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences passed detailed resolutions stipulating ways of correcting the shortcomings mentioned during the discussions and specific ways of elevating the politico-ideological and analytical standards of the journal.

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SYMPOSIUM HELD ON STUDYING LIFE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 138-139

[Report on conference organized by Soviet Sociological Association and Africa Institute in Moscow on 10-11 April 1984]

[Text] An all-union symposium on "The Way of Life, Standard of Living and Quality of Life in the Newly Liberated Countries," organized by the Soviet Sociological Association's Central Scientific Research Section on the Sociology of Developing Countries and the Africa Institute's Sector on Social Issues, was held on 10-11 April of this year. It was attended by researchers from the following academy institutes: Sociological Research, Oriental Studies, Latin America, and International Workers Movement; by researchers from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Moscow State Institute of International Relations and Komsomol Central Committee Higher Komsomol School Scientific Research Center; by instructors from schools in various cities for students from the developing countries.

The introductory speech was presented by Professor G. B. Starushenko, deputy director of the Africa Institute. He noted that Marxist social scientists in the USSR and abroad are interested in the concepts "way of life," "standard of living" and "quality of life" because the socioeconomic and politico-ideological changes that are taking place in the newly liberated countries as a result of the intensification of the social nature of national liberation revolutions are eventually reflected in qualitatively new features in the way of life of various classes and social groups. An understanding of these changes is needed for the further development of the Marxist strategy of development in newly liberated countries. G. B. Starushenko stressed that the experience of Marxist sociologists studying the Soviet society could serve as a valuable methodological basis for investigations by Soviet scientists specializing in current affairs in the newly liberated Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Deputy Director I. T. Levykin of the ISI [Sociological Research Institute], USSR Academy of Sciences, presented a report on "Methodological Problems in the Determination of Indicators of the Way of Life." He explained the details of his theory of the empirical study of the way of life and illustrated it with a great deal of documented information. The following reports were also presented at the symposium: "The Changing Way of Life in African Society and

Traditionalism" by L. D. Yablochkov (Africa Institute), "The New Individual and the Revolutionary Process in Latin America" by A. F. Shul'govskiy (Latin America Institute), "Quantitative and Qualitative Criteria of Poverty in South and Southeast Asian Countries" by L. F. Pakhomova (Oriental Studies Institute) and "Social Awareness in the System of Way of Life Indicators" by V. M. Kirko (Africa Institute). The need for the further study of this subject matter and for the use of the sociological methods in research and in ideological indoctrinational work was mentioned by symposium speakers and others during discussion groups and when the work of the symposium was being summarized. They also noted that uniting the efforts of the research teams of academy institutes and of professors and instructors in social science departments will help to raise the analytical level and enhance the practical value of research.

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AFRICA, ASIA INSTITUTES' CONFERENCE ON LIBERATED COUNTRIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 139-141

[Report on joint session of academic councils of USSR Academy of Sciences Africa Institute and Oriental Studies Institute in Moscow on 28 March]

[Text] Professor R. A. Ul'yanovskiy, doctor of economic sciences, presented a report on "Some Current Analytical Problems in the Contemporary Development of Newly Liberated Countries" at the session on 28 March of this year.

In recent years the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America have played a more important role as sovereign subjects in international affairs. Imperialism has been shaken severely by the anti-imperialist, anticolonial struggle, its sphere of influence is growing smaller, and international conditions are favorable for a struggle by progressive, democratic forces. The consistent antiwar struggle in the liberated countries warrants close attention in this context. Studies of current African and Asian affairs must be permeated with the ideals of protecting the liberation movement's gains against imperialist militarism and the danger of thermonuclear catastrophe and must defend the foreign policy line of the CPSU. Studies of the nonaligned movement, its place and role in international affairs and the means of its further convergence with the socialist world are quite pertinent at this time. Systems for the classification of this movement and of the countries belonging to it and, what is most important, studies of the movement's development prospects are quite important. Now that the danger of thermonuclear catastrophe is so acute and the antiwar movement has grown stronger, nonalignment essentially represents nonalignment with the military segment of the bourgeoisie.

Problems in the overall social, economic and political classification of liberated countries and various means and forms of their development require thorough study. Such terms as the "relatively independent" and "dependent" types of capitalist development in liberated countries do not take sufficient notice of the presence of imperialist capitalism and non-imperialist capitalism, which has not matured to the point of monopolist capitalism as yet, in the capitalist world. The countries of non-imperialist capitalism still do not have their own transnational monopolies or established financial capital, and they have not experienced the merger of banking and industrial capital. These processes are just beginning. The main thing is the division of the capitalist world into an exploiting world and an exploited world, which is

connected with imperialism's continued plundering of the liberated countries. It is true that some researchers prefer to use the term "losses" rather than "plundering," ignoring the fact that the total value of the funds transnational monopolies have appropriated from the economies of developing countries has reached, according to UN estimates, 200 billion dollars, and that plundering on this scale was unheard of in colonial times.

The nature of the liberated countries' conflicts with imperialism, their latest, constantly changing, forms and dynamics, changes in the relationship between economic and political factors and the distinctive features of these countries' social, political and economic confrontation with imperialism in the present and future are important research topics. They are also important in an understanding of the global balance of power between the two world systems and in the determination of socialism's prospects for a victory over imperialism.

The new international economic order is a topic warranting thorough analytical study. There is no complete Marxist-Leninist theory on this matter. The study of the political structures of liberated countries and their main classes, particularly the national bourgeoisie and its different segments, especially those with anti-imperialist aims, is quite important. The status and prospects of the state sector of the economy and the interaction of state and private enterprise require investigation. It will be important to determine whether the state sector will be the main generator of development in these countries and whether it will be antimonopolist and anti-imperialist. The experience of India and some other countries is indicative in this respect. Scientists should also focus on such important aspects of development in the liberated countries as the role of economic planning, its improvement, the eradication of feudal and semifeudal relations and their remnants in rural areas, the cooperative movement, the peasant and land question, the public standard of living and, in particular, the standard of living of the working class. Various aspects of the democratization of public life, especially the struggle against authoritarianism, Bonapartism and other deviations from the democratic norm warrant considerable attention.

The relationship between traditional and new forms of social awareness in liberated countries is quite significant at this stage of the anti-imperialist struggle. Consideration must be given to the tenacity of traditional forms, the means of their "grafting" onto new realities, and their transformation or abandonment. Only the first steps have been taken in the study of these topics.

The events of the past 20 years have demonstrated the variety of socialist-oriented, or non-capitalist, patterns of development. It will be extremely important to analyze such matters as the criteria, contradictions and social-class essence of the socialist orientation, the reasons for the mounting economic difficulties in some countries, economic underdevelopment and the means of surmounting it, and the struggle against counterrevolutionary forces (the experience of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and several other countries is indicative in this connection).

Another extremely important topic is the constitutional basis of governments in the liberated countries of Africa and parts of Asia. The creation of the majority of these states was preceded by the "composition" of a nationality. They were colonial tribal states prior to independence, but the alliance of tribes and their struggle against predatory foreign monopolies and imperialism led--contrary to all formal principles of theory--in many cases to the establishment of national states before a nationality existed. Imperialists often make use of this knowledge in their attempts to destabilize these states and "prove" that they are unconstitutional.

Finally, the Marxist-Leninist parties' creation of their own independent class base in liberated countries is a pertinent topic. The working class is supposed to serve as this base. Many parties have a petty bourgeois composition, although there is a working class in these countries and its size doubles every 15 years or so. Many Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary-democratic parties are becoming influential mass parties guided by the ideology of scientific socialism. These processes must be reflected in studies by Soviet experts on Asian and African affairs.

In connection with R. A. Ul'yanovskiy's 80th birthday, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences An. A. Gromyko, director of the Africa Institute, noted the great contribution R. A. Ul'yanovskiy has made during his career spanning over half a century to the study of economic, historical and sociopolitical processes in the Asian and African countries and to the investigation of various aspects of the international communist, workers and national liberation movements and praised the characteristic depth of the scientist's analyses and his ingenious way of discussing various issues.

Academician Ye. M. Primakov, director of the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, discussed R. A. Ul'yanovskiy's services in the establishment and development of Soviet Oriental studies and his multifaceted activity in official party positions.

Academician L. F. Il'ichev, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, mentioned the creative, deeply party-minded nature of R. A. Ul'yanovskiy's scientific and social work. Hearty greetings were extended to R. A. Ul'yanovskiy by Vice-Chancellor S. P. Novoselov of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences, Deputy Director I. Ye. Gur'yev of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences, Professor Yu. N. Gavrilov from the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, sector chief V. Ye. Chirkin from the Institute of Government and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences, Editor-in-Chief A. A. Kutsenkov of NARODY AZII I AFRIKI and Assistant Chief Editor V. K. Turadzhev of AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA.

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BOOK ON SOCIALIST ORIENTATION OF DEVELOPING STATES REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 184-186

[Review by M. M. Avsenev of book "Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya osvobodivshikhsya stran. Nekotoryye voprosy teorii i praktiki" [The Socialist Orientation of Newly Liberated Countries. Some Aspects of Theory and Practice] by K. N. Brutents, Anat. A. Gromyko, A. V. Kiva, G. F. Kim, G. I. Mirskiy, Ye. M. Primakov, V. F. Stanis, G. B. Starushenko, G. V. Smirnov and R. A. Ul'yanovskiy, Moscow, Mysl', 1982, 307 pages]

[Text] This monograph, written by a team of prominent experts on the developing countries, including countries with a socialist orientation, adds fundamentally new features to the Marxist-Leninist analysis of natural tendencies in the transition of young states to socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development. The monograph is comprehensive: The authors examine probably all of the main events and aspects of the development of socialist-oriented countries--internal political, economic, social and international. Some of the processes and developments discussed in the book have either never been researched by Soviet authors or have been investigated only within the context of a specific research topic.

For example, the first section of the book, in which the socialist orientation is described accurately as a unique pre-socialist transition stage, "during which the material, social and cultural prerequisites for the construction of socialism are established" (p 34), the authors underscore the complex and contradictory nature of this stage and warn about the dangers of attempts to "accelerate it with a view to known examples of the evolution of national liberation revolutions into socialist ones, to identify it with socialist reconstruction and to thereby view national democrats as confirmed adherents of scientific socialism" (p 38).

The authors raise interesting questions about the internal conditions of the move by various countries (or groups of countries) to the socialist-oriented pattern of development. The authors draw what we regard as a fundamentally important conclusion about the impossibility of explaining the socialist orientation only as a result of "objective socioeconomic factors" (p 57). We would even add that the objective socioeconomic prerequisites for the socialist choice do not even exist in the majority of newly liberated countries in the

form in which they were discussed by the founders of Marxism. For these countries, "normal" capitalist development would mean indisputable progress in comparison to the colonial-feudal order they had prior to independence. But the inhibition of this "normal" development by the domination of the non-socialist world by imperialist powers and transnational corporations and the peculiar revolutionary situation which arose in a number of the young states gave "farsighted and courageous leaders" (p 57) a chance to lead their countries onto a road guaranteeing their accelerated development and simultaneously alleviating the adverse effects of this development on the laboring masses.

The second section, in which some aspects of the socialist orientation as a transitional form of development toward socialism are analyzed, contains the first detailed discussion in our literature of the criteria of socialist orientation, and it will certainly arouse the reader's interest. This is extremely important in view of the fact that the leaders of some countries developing along capitalist lines call themselves socialists and conceal their policies, which are frequently reactionary, behind socialist phrases. Attempts to define these criteria were made earlier—for example, during discussions organized by the journal PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA* and at a conference of several communist and workers parties in tropical and southern Africa.** But the definitions presented in the documents of these meetings include specific objectives and even suggestions addressed to this group of countries among the criteria of socialist orientation. In this work the discussion pertains precisely to criteria in the strict sense of the term, as factors determining the social-class essence of socialist orientation.

The monograph contains an extremely logical and detailed analysis of the conflicts characteristic of the stage of socialist orientation, although some of them (for example, conflicts between various structures) are typical of the entire period of transition to socialism, and not only of this specific stage. In connection with this, it might be expedient to point out the fact that some of the problems which are solved during the course of socialist reforms in developed countries are solved (or at least begin to be solved) during the stage of socialist orientation in underdeveloped countries.

The authors also present a detailed analysis of the political leadership in socialist-oriented countries, the revolutionary-democratic current, its social roots and ideology, the revolutionary-democratic parties and the relations between revolutionary democrats and communists. Revolutionary democracy is viewed as a transitional political form which will inevitably evolve either in the direction of scientific socialism (if the left wing gains the upper hand) or "to the right," in the direction of a departure from socialist orientation (see pp 116-119). Interesting ideas are also expressed about the stages in the development of socialist orientation (see pp 142-143).

The examination of the economic problems of socialist orientation and the experience of socialist-oriented countries in the resolution of these problems

* PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1978, No 1.

** RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNYY MIR, 1979, No 4.

occupies a prominent place in the work. The authors' concern with economic problems is quite understandable. V. I. Lenin stressed that socialism can and must display its superiority to capitalism chiefly and primarily in the sphere of economics. Lenin's statement also applies to socialist orientation, which establishes the objective conditions for the elimination of two elements of underdevelopment--economic backwardness and economic dependence--"more consistently, on a democratic basis and in the interests of the majority of their population" (p 157).

The authors present a comprehensive analysis of the economic activities of these states and their experience in agrarian reform, industrialization and economic planning. They discuss the difficulties encountered by the revolutionary democratic parties in the resolution of all these problems, difficulties connected with inadequate economic potential, limited resources, the lack of experience in national economic management and so forth, but they also stress that the socialist-oriented countries are already ahead of the states with capitalist development patterns in many respects, especially in the improvement of working and living conditions for the majority of the population (p 230).

In the final section of the work, socialist orientation is analyzed as a factor in international affairs. The authors note that the young states which have chosen socialism are among the front-line fighters for national liberation and nonalignment and against imperialism, colonialism and racism. Certain specific features, particularly consideration for the principles of proletarian internationalism, broader cooperation with socialist countries and solidarity with the foreign policy actions of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, and adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence, have been clearly displayed in the foreign policy doctrines and practices of these states along with common features characteristic of the foreign policy of the majority of developing countries (see pp 238, 250 et passim). The idea of the need for this kind of cooperation is one of the main themes of the monograph.

The authors also discuss international imperialism's subversive activity against socialist-oriented countries, describing all of the methods it employs, from overt aggression to ideological subversion, to promote the destabilization, and in some cases the degeneration, of progressive regimes. In connection with this, the authors examine events in Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Afghanistan and some other countries in detail. Although international imperialism's actions are complicating the development of socialist-oriented countries and presenting them with additional difficulties, the authors stress that it "has been unable to cause the failure of socialist orientation as a broad-scale social movement" (p 274). The same section contains criticism of anti-communist attacks on the theory and practice of the transition to socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development, and suggested alternatives--"revolution from above," bourgeois-liberal concepts and national-reformism.

Extremely important conclusions are presented at the end of the work. The main one is that "socialist orientation is not something superficial or accidental." It "arises during the national liberation struggle, is engendered by the natural development of this struggle and is constantly

reproduced in spite of difficulties and temporary failures" (p 292). This conclusion is corroborated primarily by the increase in the number of socialist-oriented countries, from three at the beginning of the 1960's to around twenty at the beginning of the 1980's, despite the disruption of the progressive development of some countries once taking the non-capitalist road. This conclusion is also corroborated by the growing scales of socioeconomic and political reforms in socialist-oriented countries and the increase in the number of revolutionary-democratic parties choosing Marxism-Leninism as the analytical and ideological basis of their activity. This last fact, as experience has demonstrated, creates opportunities for the increasingly effective management of society along the road to socialism.

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BOOK DISCUSSING OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY OF ALGERIA REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 84 (signed to press 16 Oct 84) pp 195-197

[Review by M. Yu. Roshchin of book "Ofitsial'naya ideologiya sovremennogo Alzhira" [Official Ideology of Present-Day Algeria] by A. V. Malashenko, Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatel'stva "Nauka," 1983, 136 pages, with bibliography on pages 132-135]

[Text] It seems that the old colonial empires collapsed just a short time ago, but stable tendencies in socioeconomic and ideological development are already apparent in many young Afro-Asian countries. It has been just a little over 20 years since Algeria won its independence, and this increases the pertinence of the monograph being reviewed, an analysis of the process by which an Algerian state ideology was established. This is the first study of this topic: No works dealing exclusively with this matter have been published in our country or abroad. This is not surprising: After all, the official ideology of Algeria has been taking shape before our very eyes, and its sources, with the National Charter serving as the main one, as the author correctly points out (p 6), were published just recently. In the middle of the 1970's A. V. Malashenko was working in Algeria and was able to collect all of the available references to this subject. His personal impressions, in our opinion, were a great help in his objective interpretation of Algerian political documents.

The work deals with the 1965-1976 period, and the choice of this period, the author stresses, was not coincidental. The government headed by Houari Boumediene took charge in 1965 and reinforced Algeria's plans to build a new society. Progressive reforms continued to be carried out in the country in subsequent years, and this was accompanied by the establishment of an Algerian state ideology. In 1970 Algerian leaders declared the principle of the "triple revolution"--industrial, agrarian and cultural. In 1976 a new ideological platform was published in Algeria. This was the National Charter, which summed up the results of the ideological inquiries of previous years. In this context, the chronological framework the author chose for his research is quite understandable.

The first section contains an analysis of the Algerian concept of "socialism" and the National Charter. For the leaders of independent Algeria, the desire to build socialism has served as a constant incentive for consistent

socioeconomic development. Pragmatism, however, has prevailed in the Algerian leadership's interpretation of ideological issues. The author points out the "vagueness" of the concept of "Algerian socialism" and the deliberately terse definitions of its basic premises. In contrast to scientific socialism, "Algerian socialism" is closely related to nationalism, which, according to Algerian ideologists, also serves as a fundamental source of societal development. The nationalism of the Algerians, the author warns, is rooted in the tragic memories of the hard struggle for independence. Colonizers tried to destroy the traditional Algerian way of life, and for this reason "protests against the total destruction of Algerian society took the form of fervent patriotism dressed in religious garb" (p 19). The author is correct, but he should have explained this statement more fully, so that the reader would have a better understanding of the distinctive nature of Algeria's history. French colonizers ruled the country for more than 100 years. Furthermore, they actively cultivated a French bourgeois civilization here. The Algerian people faced the danger of gradually turning into second-rate Frenchmen. The issue of national self-determination was not as vital in many other Arab countries. Nationalism based on Muslim traditions was a symbol of national salvation for the Algerians. It is not surprising that the National Charter says that "Algerian popular nationalism therefore represented one of the new liberation movements capable of carrying the struggle all the way to the point of the establishment of a revolutionary regime, rather than to the point of domination by a bourgeoisie making use of newly acquired independence for its own purposes" (p 19). A. V. Malashenko clearly ascertains the close interaction of concepts of socialist development and nationalism in Algerian official ideology and even their complete merger (pp 19-20).

Pointing to anticapitalism as one of the main features of official Algerian ideology, the author correctly writes that "the influence of Marxist scientific thought played an important role in the formation of the anticapitalist convictions of Algerian revolutionaries" (p 22).

It is significant that even the National Charter does not contain a precise definition of the term "socialism." Although the author makes a statement to the contrary, he does not quote this definition (see pp 41-42). And this is understandable because there is no such definition in the document. The pragmatism of the Algerian leadership in ideological matters is clearly reflected in this policy statement. In spite of this, A. V. Malashenko makes an attempt to list the main elements of the Algerian concept of "socialism." In his opinion, the most important is the realization of the public sector's leading role in the socioeconomic development of the country and of the need for agrarian reforms designed to eradicate feudal relations in rural areas and for the unipartite system of government which took shape during the course of the revolutionary struggle.

The author carefully analyzes Algerian political documents, especially the National Charter and the statements of H. Boumediene, and skillfully reveals their ideological content. Even when he criticizes the inconsistency and lack of balance in certain aspects of Algerian official ideology, his criticism is well-intentioned and tactful. For example, the author carefully traces the evolution of the Algerian leaders' ideas about the role of the working class

in the modernization of Algeria. They initially viewed the working class only as a fellow-traveler in the revolution (p 44). Gradually, however, the role of the working class was reassessed during the industrialization of the Algerian national economy. Nevertheless, as A. V. Malashenko points out, "there is no precise definition of the term 'worker' in official ideology. Apparently, we can assume that the absence of any clear distinctions reflects a desire to make the term 'worker' part of the broader category of 'laborer'" (pp 46-47). At the end of this chapter, A. V. Malashenko says that "the situation in official Algerian ideology in the 1960's and 1970's attests to a stable tendency toward the testing and development of the socialist orientation" (p 65). The author's conclusion is supported well by the entire preceding analysis of sources.

In the second chapter the author analyzes Islam's effect on official Algerian ideology. Referring constantly to sources, the author describes the complex and contradictory feelings of Algerian official ideologists toward Muslim values. On the one hand, "the search for a unique development pattern and the affirmation of the specific nature of Algerian 'socialism' were associated with loyalty to Islamic traditions" (p 66). On the other hand, and this is also described well in the work, the Algerian revolutionary-democratic leadership wanted to put Muslim religious activity under state control and prevent the subversion of state ideology under the banner of religion. Some traditional aspects of North African religious life, such as maraboutism, were discouraged by the state, but there is every reason to speak of the regeneration of the "Islamic factor" in Algeria in certain respects. Here we would like to direct attention to something which was not, in our opinion, emphasized adequately by A. V. Malashenko. During the colonial period, Algeria was the target of French cultural expansion as well as economic expansion. The traditional Arab Muslim culture in the country was denigrated. After the country had won its independence, many Algerian intellectuals could speak and write in French perfectly but could not write in Arabic. Boumediene's persistent efforts to Arabize the educational system naturally revitalized Islam, and this is not surprising in view of the indissoluble unity of the traditional Arab and Muslim education.

In the second chapter the author discusses some of the most sensitive aspects of the Algerian ideologists' attitude toward Islam. For example, he tells us that the authors of the draft National Charter did not state that Islam was the official religion of the country. This, as A. V. Malashenko points out, "was immediately used by the Muslim clergy as a pretext to organize an entire campaign for the 'defense of Islam.' Playing on the emotions of devout Muslims, religious circles were able to include a statement to this effect in the text of the National Charter" (p 86). These conflicts clearly attest to serious tendencies toward secularism among Algeria's official ideologists. The author points this out again in his analysis of the views of prominent Algerian historian M. Lacheraf, the president's adviser on cultural affairs in the 1960's, on traditional Islam (pp 89-91).

The modernization of Islam is analyzed in the third chapter. A. V. Malashenko cites the works of prominent Algerian thinker Ahmed Arua, the most brilliant representative of Muslim revival in the country, as an example of the new

approach to Muslim ideology. The problem of modernization in the broad sense of the term is an extremely vital issue in many Muslim countries today. How can the vital requirements of technological revolution be combined with the traditional Muslim way of life? How can Islam respond to the challenge of the present technological era? Obviously, the answers to today's questions are not always the same in different Muslim countries. The supporters of the traditional approach believe that the Muslim way of life is the best of all possible ways and that contemporary socioeconomic development can undermine the ideals of Muslim society. Modernist Muslims advocate certain changes in the traditional way of life and are striving to prove that Islam can be adapted to the requirements of the present day. A. V. Malashenko correctly stresses that the majority of Algerian Muslim ideologists are modernists, and for this reason he concentrates on their views. The modernists, in the author's opinion, are inclined to rely on the *ijtihad*.^{*} In this connection, he cites H. Boumediene's statement that "the cessation of *ijtihad* would lead to the stagnation of Muslim law and would rob it of its essence and its primary function of making the correct decisions on new events and problems--in short, this would make it unable to keep up with progress, even though Islam is suited to any time or place" (p 93).

Modernists have restored the *ijtihad* to cleanse Islam of various historical accretions. For example, A. Arua frankly says that "it is impossible to be loyal to the spirit of Islam today without being a revolutionary, and this means a bold move toward dynamic revolutionary interpretation, which should triumph and surmount temporary conflicts" (p 97).

A. V. Malashenko employs Marxist-Leninist methodology productively for an analysis of the ideas of contemporary Muslim ideology in Algeria and its correspondence to official ideology. The author expresses interesting opinions about the incomplete correspondence of the views of modernist Muslim thinkers and revolutionary democrats. He believes that "the modernists' attempts to adapt to the ideology and policy of revolutionary democrats do not preclude, however, differences of opinion among them" (p 122).

A. V. Malashenko's work will give the reader a fairly broad understanding of the developmental dynamics of Algerian official ideology. The author has been able to trace stable tendencies in the development of revolutionary-democratic views. When he finishes the last page of the book, the reader will be firmly convinced that the choice of a socialist orientation was natural for Algeria.

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- END -

* *Ijtihad* is the right of a competent and knowledgeable Islamic expert to make independent decisions on some legal-theological matters.